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INTRODUCTION 
 
I recently attended a lecture and panel discussion on Russia’s intervention in Crimea, which 
involved several Baltic and Eastern European diplomats and Russian security expert ret. 
Dutch Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel de Haas. During the discussion on the official Russian 
pretext for invasion, the issue of security for Crimea’s ethnic Russians was raised, at which 
time de Haas gestured towards the Lithuanian diplomat to his left and quipped that, since 
speaking Russian constitutes the basic distinction between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic 
Russians, then he and the Lithuanian diplomat ought to feel uneasy that they too could fall 
under Vladimir Putin’s “protection.”   
 
De Haas’s comment, of course, implied doubt over the extent to which Crimea’s Russian 
speakers really make up an ethnic group. But this question is largely irrelevant. What 
matters more is that, by justifying intervention in terms of “protecting ethnic Russians,” 
Putin conjured the imagery and fear of ethnic conflict, with all of its bloody, riotous 
connotations. Such powerful connotations offered Putin a clear strategic utility in his move 
to annex Crimea, a utility that he was sure to enhance through rhetoric. In his speech to the 
State Duma shortly after Crimea’s referendum, he pronounced that “Crimea is primordial 
‘Russkaya’ land, and Sevastapol is a ‘Russkii’ city” (Marten, 2014: para. 3). But what is the 
source of the power summoned by Putin’s ‘ethnic’ call? 
 
For several decades, scholars have grappled with the phenomenon of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic 
groups.’ Their efforts have taken many forms and have produced many interesting theories 
and avenues of research, but definitive conclusions on the subject remain ever elusive. In 
many regards, theorizing about ethnicity, its nature and its effects, has been akin to 
attempting to capture smoke with one’s bare hands.  
 
I make no special claim to furthering this task here, but rather, seek to change track and 
approach the subject from a perspective that avoids the fuzziness of past debates. 
Accepting from the outset the, sometimes obscured, reality that ethnic groups are 
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malleable and changeable products of society rather than antecedents to it, I consider 
whether the construction and salience of ethnic groups and identities can be explained 
exclusively by the instrumental pursuit of benefits, in the form of economic and political 
outcomes. The propositions I am concerned with testing, therefore, are those that are 
contained within a subset of the broader literature on ethnicity, termed ‘instrumentalist,’ 
which sees ethnic groups as nominal coalitions of self-interested agents, and thus sees 
ethnicity as without intrinsic value. To approach the empirical component of my research 
with conceptual and theoretical clarity, I synthesize instrumentalist propositions into a 
model that elucidates their core expectations concerning ethnic identity stability and 
change. I then deploy this model empirically to direct my analysis of three cases, each 
involving a salient ethnic group or cleavage: the Yoruba of Nigeria, the Hutu – Tutsi 
cleavage in Rwanda, and the Romani in historical and contemporary Hungary. Though my 
choice of cases might seem strangely eclectic, each presents a distinct type of problem for 
which the explanatory power of instrumentalist theory will be explored.  
 
The governmental challenges associated with ethnic diversity, which include inter-group 
conflicts and inequalities, recognition dilemmas, or the management of ‘minority claims’ on 
the state, continue to abound around the world. Yet only with a clearer theoretical 
understanding of ethnic groups – their nature and their dynamics – can sound policy 
decisions be made. As such, the questions implied by the approach I take below, though the 
present study constitutes only a modest contribution in this direction, have a clear and 
pressing social and political relevance. These questions include: How much does culture 
matter? And can ethnicity be valued intrinsically? 
 
The structure for what follows will be this: part one will consist of an analytical discussion 
of the relevant literature. This will first consist of a brief analysis of definitions of ‘ethnic 
group,’ and I will present here my own definition, which will implicitly underpin 
subsequent work. Then, the classical dichotomy between ‘primordialism’ and 
‘constructivism’ will be scrutinized, and it will be shown that this debate has essentially 
been ‘miscast.’ And finally, the instrumentalist literature will be analyzed, so that its core 
propositions can be coaxed out. In part two, I synthesize these propositions into a model 
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that conceptualizes membership in an ethnic group essentially as a constrained choice, and 
I present the expectations of this model in terms of how the costs and benefits of ethnic 
group membership should determine aggregate outcomes, in the form of ethnic group 
stability or change. Also in part two, I discuss methodology and the basis for my case 
selection. Part three presents the empirical findings of my research.  
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1.1 - Definitions 
 
 
Max Weber offered what is perhaps the seminal definition of ‘ethnic groups’ when he wrote 
that: 
We shall call ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in 
their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, 
or because of memories of colonization or migration; this belief must be important 
for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or 
not an objective blood relationship exists. (1978: 389) 
 
 
Weber stresses here that ‘ethnic groups’ need not be grounded in the realm of objective 
physical characteristics, but merely in the subjective beliefs of ethnic group members 
regarding their common ancestry. The belief in a common ancestry, therefore, appears 
critical to Weber’s conception of ethnic groups. In turn, a key characteristic of Weber’s 
definition is his assertion that this belief emanates from some consistency (or ‘similarity’) 
between members of the same group. Importantly, however, he leaves very open the 
question of what exactly is to be held consistent. Weber’s definition clearly allows for 
ethnic groups whose constitution rests solely on members’ commonalities of culture, so 
long as this leads to their belief in a “common descent.”   
 
In contrast to Weber, Barth (1969) deemphasized the role of a common culture in his 
discussion of ethnic groups. Noting the cultural heterogeneity that is often found within 
ethnic groups, Barth famously asserted that ethnic groups are not characterized by their 
consistent cultural content, but rather by their specific (and strategic) use of cultural 
markers to signal the boundary between their ethnic group and another. For Barth, it is this 
“ethnic boundary that defines the group” (1969: 15).  
 
Although Barth’s and Weber’s definitions differ regarding the degree of internal 
consistency that they seem to stipulate, neither definition stipulates that physical or other 
‘given’ commonalities are essential to the concept of ethnic groups; both definitions, 
therefore, leave sizeable scope for the role of beliefs, customs and myths in defining them. 
In contrast, Chandra (2012b) attempts to offer a more ‘definitive’ definition by arguing that 
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what distinguishes ethnic groups from other group-types is that they are based on 
categories that necessarily embody “descent-based attributes.” Chandra theorizes that 
individuals possess a number of potentially ethnic identities, each based on some attribute 
(or combination of attributes) that is descent-based, and which permits the individual 
membership in the corresponding ethnic group. On close inspection, the usefulness of 
Chandra’s definition is limited because the concept of “decent-based attributes” is in itself 
indistinct. For instance, Chandra defines this concept as relating to “attributes associated 
with or believed to be associated with descent” (2012b: 59). This includes the features 
stemming from one’s genetic inheritance, such as one’s given physical features, and also 
attributes such as names, languages, religion, etc., which are also products of culture and 
socialization, and which are often subject to change during the course of one’s lifetime. 
Because the nature of the types of attributes it includes is so varied, and their ‘fixedness’ so 
variable, the singular concept of “descent-based attributes” is of very limited analytical use. 
Moreover, without further qualification, the term “descent-based attribute” seems to imply 
more rigidity and objectivity to the concept of ethnicity than is probably warranted.  
 
It’s clear that, once deconstructed, Chandra’s focus on “descent-based attributes” is not 
wholly inconsistent with Weber’s definition above. Specifically, they both highlight the 
important link between ethnicity and notions of common descent, and they both ultimately 
allow for the source of these notions (the attributes from which they stem) to be the 
subject of subjective interpretation and, in some cases, deliberate change. Horowitz, too, 
(1985; 2001), deems notions of “putative descent” to be essential to the concept of 
ethnicity. He writes that:  
 
Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it 
traits which are believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, 
and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity. (1985: 
52) 
 
Horowitz’s definition mirrors Weber’s to a large extent, although it leaves much greater 
scope for in-group heterogeneity. This, therefore, makes it more consistent with Barth’s 
observations. Again, it stipulates that ethnic identity need not be based on some 
characteristic that was definitively acquired at birth, but merely the “myth” of a common 
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ancestry based on traits that are “believed” to be innate. What is important to ethnic 
identity is that the attributes on which it is based are interpreted as being connected to 
birth and, thus, to one’s ancestral origins. The significant role for interpretation to play 
here leaves open the possibility of change in one’s ethnic identity, and for changes in the 
boundaries distinguishing ethnic groups (à la Barth).  
 
Drawing on the definitions above, I define an ‘ethnic group’ to be a group whose 
membership is based on the shared interpretation of one or more characteristics which are 
common to the group, whether bodily, linguistic, religious, customary or territorial, as 
emanating from or leading to notions of a common descent.   
 
An ‘ethnic identity’, for my purposes, is one that corresponds to membership in an ‘ethnic 
group,’ as defined. The principal theoretical alteration in this definition is that it leaves 
open the question of whether the interpretation of a characteristic causes a group’s belief in 
a common descent, or whether the belief in a common descent amongst individuals, for 
whatever reason, causes their selective interpretation of some shared characteristics. In 
other words, this definition does not favor the chicken over the egg. In addition, I do not 
use the use the term ‘myth’ because, while some ethnic groups may entertain a consistent 
myth of origin, many do so inconsistently or not at all. Our labeling of a group as ‘ethnic’ is 
clearly not contingent on their maintenance of some particular ‘myth.’ As Chandra (2012b) 
has pointed out, the myth of a common ancestry is merely a secondary characteristic that is 
dependent on some shared trait possessed by the group. Further to this, I suggest that it is 
the shared interpretation of that trait (or traits) that is fundamental to the ethnic group.  
 
My definition is a broad one and, like many others, I include such categories as race, caste, 
nation, tribe, religion, linguistic group, etcetera, as being potentially ethnic; so long as the 
underlying attribute (or attributes) in a given context is interpreted as relating to notions 
of shared descent1. This qualification explains why ‘Protestant’ in the United States is not 
an ‘ethnic’ category, whereas it is in Northern Ireland, where religious identity is 
                                                        
1 Like Horowitz (1985), I would add a minimal scale requirement here to distinguish ethnic groups 
from conventional ‘families’.  
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interpreted as relating to descent rather than simple conversion (Fearon, 2006). 
Additionally, it’s important to note explicitly that, because ethnic identity is the subject of 
interpretation within a population, it is activated both through processes of subscription 
(by self) and ascription (by others). It is not enough merely to ‘feel’ oneself a member of 
ethnic group x; but one must also bare the shared characteristics of that group in a way that 
is consistent with popular interpretations, at a minimum. Conversely, it is the case that 
others may ascribe to an individual an ethnic identity even without that individual’s self-
identification with the corresponding group. On the whole, however, we can expect that in 
most cases self-identification with a group will coincide with the ascriptive interpretations 
of others.  
 
 
 
 
1.2 - The Nature of Ethnic Groups: Primordialism vs. Constructivism 
 
 
By defining ethnic groups as I have above, I have not meant to preempt the discussion 
about their nature. While I propose a definition of ethnicity that is based on a group’s 
shared interpretations of traits, the question of the purpose, meaning or substance of ethnic 
groups (many theories of which could be consistent with my definition) remains open. The 
voluminous literature on the nature of ethnicity and ethnic groups has been classically 
dichotomized into ‘primordialist’ and ‘constructivist’ camps, which will now be considered.  
 
While the dictionary definition of the term implies something ahistorical, there is virtually 
no ‘ahistoricism’ to the various ‘primordial’ accounts of ethnicity. As self-declared 
‘primordialist’ Van Evera asserts, “our ethnic identities are not stamped on our genes” 
(2001: 20). Chandra has noted that “the key distinguishing aspect of the primordialist view 
is that an individual’s ethnic identity becomes immutable once acquired, no matter where it 
comes from” (2001: 7), yet the immutability of ethnic identities is also not a defining 
feature of primordialism. It seems that primordialists largely accept that ethnic categories 
are malleable and that their reconstruction can occur; they simply assert that such 
reconstruction is both difficult and rare (Van Evera, 2001; Hale, 2004; Horowitz, 1985). In 
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general, therefore, the primordial view has stressed that ethnicity is, for practical purposes, 
fixed. So-called primordialists also propound that ethnic identity exists as a powerful force 
in its own right, which is to say that ethnic identity is inherently emotive and substantive. 
Geertz, for example, writes that: 
 
Congruities [between ethnic group members] of blood, speech, custom, and so on, 
are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of 
themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, 
ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, 
common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some 
unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. (1973: 259) 
 
 
In addition to considering ethnicity as being practically fixed and inherently emotive, the 
proposition that ethnic identity is singular has also frequently been attached to 
primordialism (e.g. Chandra, 2001; Chandra, 2005; Chandra, 2012b). On this count, as on 
the others noted above, substantial ambiguity exists. In defending his ‘primordialist’ view, 
Bayar, for instance, writes that “where constructivists assume multiple ethnic identities 
primordialists see a single ethnic identity with multiple dimensions” (2004: 1643). In 
general, this confusion seems to stem from differences in definitions. Chandra (2012a: 11) 
offers a useful resolution to the question of multidimensionality by highlighting the 
conceptual difference between ‘activated’ and ‘nominal’ ethnic categories. While 
individuals or populations hold a ‘repertoire’ of attributes from which multiple ethnic 
identities may be composed, the ‘activated’ ethnic identity for an individual in a given 
context can be conceived as singular (ibid).  
 
The core tenets of constructivist approaches to ethnicity are easier to nail down, for the 
most part because scholars appear more ready to state them explicitly. Chandra, for 
example, asserts that the propositions that ethnic identities are multiple, fluid and 
endogenous “are the minimal propositions that scholarship labeled ‘constructivist’ has in 
common” (2012b: 140). As noted above, however, since few (if any) primordialists actually 
claim that ethnicity is truly a ‘given’ of human existence, scholars from both camps 
ultimately agree that ethnic identity is constructed. Indeed, as Hale (2004: 461) has 
commented, the primordial versus constructivist theoretical dichotomization is therefore 
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somewhat ‘miscast’, and probably serves to obscure, rather than enhance, our 
understanding of ethnicity.  
 
A better way to approach the subject of ethnicity has been to start with the proposition that 
ethnicity, and ‘ethnic groups’, are constructed, and then to look at the processes at work to 
form and re-form them. Once the endogeneity of ethnic identity is established, the diverse 
range of theories seeking to explain ethnic groups can be ordered in terms of the types of 
processes that they present as important. Are ethnic groups the product of cognitive or 
social-psychological phenomena, such as our need to impose order on our surroundings 
(e.g. Hale, 2004) or our need for kinship-like networks (e.g. Horowitz, 1985)? Or are ethnic 
or national identities related to patterns of broad-based socio-economic change (e.g. 
Gellner, 1983)? Or are ethnic groups merely a type of interest group, what Brubaker (2002: 
167) has called “practical categories…institutional forms” or “political projects”, formed 
and shaped in line with economic or political incentive structures and opportunities? 
 
Clearly, each of these different types of process implies a distinct view about what ethnicity 
is and also about how quickly ethnic identity can change. In other words, each type of 
process leads to different conclusions regarding both the substance of ethnic identity and 
the extent of ethnic group endogeneity. Since, as shown above, a consensus basically exists 
among scholars on the proposition that ethnic groups are socially constructed, and since 
we can mostly resolve the issue of multidimensionality by distinguishing between 
‘activated’ and ‘nominal’ ethnic categories (Chandra, 2012a), we can refine our research on 
the nature of ethnic groups by testing empirically the propositions contained within the 
various theories of ethnicity against cases where we observe change in activated ethnic 
identity (at the individual level), and consequently, change in ethnic groups (at the macro 
level). Equally, the same logic should be applied to examine cases where, despite 
substantial contextual variation across time or space, a particular ethnic group or identity 
may persist. This study is of the type just outlined, and the propositions I wish to test are 
those contained within the various instrumentalist accounts of ethnicity.  
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1.3 - The Economic Approach to Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups 
 
To acknowledge that ethnic groups are constructed rather than given is to acknowledge 
also that ethnic groups are endogenous; that is to say, that they exist within a system of 
forces to which they are also subject. In itself, however, the proposition that ethnic groups 
are endogenous does not imply anything particular about their nature, nor that of the 
various forces to which they may be subject. Beyond the assertion that ethnic groups are 
constructed there exists great scope for differing views about what drives ethnic behavior 
(or human behavior more generally). But it is the ‘economic approach’ that I am concerned 
with here.  
 
In The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Garry Becker famously declared that he had 
“come to the position that the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable 
to all human behavior” (1976: 8). The Nobel Prize-winning economist summarized this 
approach as follows:  
 
The heart of my argument is that human behavior is not compartmentalized, 
sometimes based on maximizing sometimes not, sometimes motivated by stable 
preferences, sometimes by volatile ones, sometimes resulting in an optimal 
accumulation of information, sometimes not. Rather, all human behavior can be 
viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of 
preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a 
variety of markets. (1976: 14) 
 
 
The propositions contained within this summary form the basic assumptions underpinning 
what we know as the classic ‘rational’ model of behavior in the social sciences. Indeed, 
rational choice theory has been tremendously influential over the past several decades, as 
scholars, following in the spirit of Becker (and others), have sought to explain all manner of 
behavioral phenomena by way of referring to a particular view of man as a rational being. 
Man is rational, the theory goes, when he pursues his individual self-interest, defined 
according to a cost-benefit analysis relative to his consistent preferences. Because rational 
behavior is necessarily goal-oriented, it is also termed ‘instrumental rational’ (Varshney, 
 15 
2003). It is this instrumental rationality that is the essence of the economic approach, 
which I will refer to simply as ‘instrumentalist’ from hereon2.   
 
Scholars of ethnicity and ethnic groups have differed according to the scope of their 
rational inquiries into ethnic phenomena. Some scholars, for example, have addressed 
some of the behaviors of ethnic groups, such as their entering into conflict (e.g. Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), or the extent of their political mobilization (e.g. 
Posner, 2004; Chandra, 2005). The results of these inquires have often pointed 
convincingly to rational, economic explanations. But that ethnic groups may be observed 
acting in an instrumental-rational manner says little in itself about ethnicity. ‘Ethnic’ 
groups are ‘groups’ nonetheless and, as Horowitz notes: “It is not surprising that 
individuals should find them useful vehicles for the pursuit of their own interests.” (2001: 
47).  
 
Other scholars have approached the subject in much more fundamental terms, arguing that 
ethnic groups, and the affiliations that comprise them, are fundamentally instrumental-
rational. Though they do not always state it explicitly, these scholars see ethnic groups as 
nominal organizational categories, “institutional forms, political projects and contingent 
events” (Brubaker, 2002: 167), the value of which is given by their instrumental utility to 
the pursuit of individual ends, given by economic, political and social outcomes (such as 
money, political power and status). Ethnic groups are thus seen essentially as coalitions, 
whose purpose is intrinsically tied to the material situation of members. Crawford Young 
summarized this position when he wrote that:   
 
Cultural collectivities are not simply disembodied primordial givens, but contingent 
patterns of solidarity whose activation depends upon the organization and 
mobilization of consciousness on the one hand, and the intrusion of the political 
process in the form of perceived domination, competition, threats, or advantages, on 
the other. (1983: 659) 
 
 
                                                        
2 The term ‘instrumentalism’ has a broader meaning in the popular and philosophical sense 
(Varshney, 2003), but it is in the economic sense that I use it here.  
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For scholars in this tradition, the activation of an ethnic identity at the individual level on 
the one hand, and the salience of an ethnic group cleavage on the other, are events that are 
conditional on the incentive structures of a particular time and space. Far from having an 
“unaccountable absolute import” (Geertz, 1973: 259), instrumentalist scholars see ethnic 
groups as having a very accountable and relative import. Instrumentalists also frequently 
argue that particular ethnic mobilizations are conjured by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’; political 
elites who exploit and ferment cultural or physical differences among a population in order 
to raise an exclusive coalition capable of capturing state resources (e.g. Bates, 1983; Young, 
1976; among many others).   
 
From this it follows that the endurance of particular ethnic groups is said to result mostly 
from their continued ability to provide for their members. Though the context of his 
argument was in Africa’s modern states, Bates explicitly captured the instrumentalist view 
in this respect when he wrote that: 
 
Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services 
from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members. Insofar 
as they provide these benefits to their members, they are able to gain their support 
and achieve their loyalty. (1983: 161) 
 
 
It is important to point out here that the economic approach to ethnic groups is not 
necessarily at odds with social-psychological conceptions of groups a means for individuals 
to impose order and understanding on their surroundings (Hale, 2004). This, for many 
instrumentalists, provides for the predisposition of individuals to ‘group’ in general.3 But 
what provides for groups in particular are the sets of outcomes with which they are 
associated. In other words, it would be consistent with an instrumentalist position to say 
that ethnic group bonds are valuable and potentially emotive. But it would not be 
consistent with an instrumentalist position to say that such value or emotion derives 
intrinsically from the ethnic bond. This distinction makes it possible for instrumentalists to 
justify emotive, seemingly irrational acts of ethnic violence, for example, in rational terms; 
as such acts are said to strengthen, protect or improve the standing of the group and, thus, 
                                                        
3 See, for example, Young’s discussion of “Identity as a Social Role” (1976: 38-39). 
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its outcomes, and, thus, one’s own (Hechter, 2000).  
 
Just as instrumentalists consider that the value of ethnic groups derives from the outcomes 
they can achieve, rather than any intrinsic substance, so too do they refrain from attributing 
intrinsic worth to the characteristics that define the group. To be sure, such characteristics, 
be they bodily, linguistic, religious, customary or whatever, are not without value, but their 
value is again said to derive from value of their associated outcomes, which, in the context 
of ethnic groups, corresponds to the groups to which particular characteristics may grant 
access4. This point is best exemplified by Barth’s discussion of “boundary maintaining” by 
ethnic groups. Cultural or other characteristics, for example, “are used by the [ethnic] 
actors as signals and emblems of differences” (1969:14). Young also writes that: 
“appreciation of uniqueness also requires perception of what differentiates the group from 
others- speech, code, symbols, values, religion, ritual, or physical appearance” (1976: 41). 
These characteristics form, thus, the ‘boundary’ that is employed instrumentally to 
maintain the exclusivity of the group.  
 
In turn, this boundary is said to be the subject of strategic manipulation, being made more 
or less restrictive depending on the circumstances of the group. The purpose of the 
boundary is to maximize the per capita value of the resources the group controls or seeks 
to control. This idea follows logically from the proposition that ethnic groups (and the 
people who comprise them) wish to maximize their outcomes (this feature is often implicit 
within the instrumentalist literature, but is noted explicitly by Barth, 1969; Glazer & 
Moynihan, 1974; Bates, 1983; Fearon, 1999; Chandra, 2004; Chandra & Boulet, 2012; 
among others).  
 
An obvious question provoked by instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity is that of why it 
is rational to mobilize ethnically, rather than by class or some other category. This question 
                                                        
4 This account is somewhat stylized. The relationship between cultural characteristics, for example, 
and ethnic groups and rationality is, no doubt, a complex one. It may be possible to argue that some 
cultural trait is valuable end in itself, in an instrumental-rational sense. But such an argument 
would be difficult to make in the context of ethnic groups because culture exists independently of 
ethnic groups (and frequently crosscuts groups) and may thus be acquired independently of 
ethnicity.  
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has been addressed in various ways. Bates (1983: 158-160), for example, argued that 
because the “benefits of modernity” are distributed spatially, local groups develop a 
“mythology of consanguinity” designed to exclude outsiders. This argument is dealt a blow 
by the fact that competing ethnic claims often originate from within the same 
administrative unit (Fearon, 1999). Other instrumentalists have asserted that ethnic 
categories are preferred over non-ethnic ones because the characteristics that define them 
tend to be harder to change. Fearon (1999) takes this position, for instance, as does 
Chandra (2012c: 99), who considers the strategic value of ethnic categories to stem from 
their “visibility” and “stickiness.” Cohen (1969: 5) offers a different and lesser-explored 
theory, suggesting that the special utility of ethnic groups derives from the extra difficulty 
that governments encounter in “suppressing” matters of “custom.” 
 
To sum up, I highlighted in the previous section that the theoretical dichotomy between 
‘primordialists’ and ‘constructivists’ is basically a red herring, since scholars from both 
supposed camps ultimately agree that ethnic groups are socially constructed. The positions 
that I have described in this section, collectively termed ‘instrumentalist’, constitute a 
distinct subset of the broader literature on ethnicity and ethnic groups. For scholars in this 
tradition, ethnic groups are synonymous with interest groups, whose construction and 
prevalence rests on their ability to provide for their members. Ethnic identities are 
activated and ethnic groups mobilized because of their instrumental utility to achieving 
welfare outcomes. Ethnicity is not valued intrinsically, and as such, neither are the traits 
that demarcate one ethnic group from another. In the following section, I distill the core 
propositions of ‘instrumentalism’ into a basic theoretical model, which I will subsequently 
put to the test.  
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PART II: THEORETICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
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2.10 – Model 
 
In the previous section, I gave an account of the broad approach to ethnicity that 
fundamentally sees ethnic groups as coalitions of self-interested individuals. Ethnic groups 
are exclusive coalitions, demarcated by particular traits, without intrinsic value. In the 
model below, I seek to elucidate the fundamental expectations of instrumentalist 
conceptions of ethnicity. This model will then form the analytical framework against which 
my cases will later be assessed. Clearly, what follows does not take full stock of many of the 
nuances contained within the voluminous literature. Nevertheless, I feel that my approach 
is justified by the modest aim of my research, which is to examine the extent to which 
ethnicity is endogenous to particular, economic forces.  
 
 
2.11 – Basic Structure 
 
 
For ‘instrumentalists’, some ethnic identity ‘x’ is activated and employed as a result of its 
instrumentality to achieving favorable outcomes for the individual. Ethnic groups, in turn, 
represent coalitions of these interests. Ethnic identity x, therefore, has some value or utility, 
which I will term ‘E’, to give ‘Ex’ for identity x.  
 
If we assume a stable preference for welfare among some hypothetical population N, with 
two possible ethnic categories, x and y,  
 
If:  Ex > Ey, 
 
 
Then all individuals comprising N would prefer identity x to y, since it has higher payoffs. 
No ethnic cleavage would emerge within this population.   
 
This assumes:  
 
1.  Zero intrinsic value attached to identities x and y;  
2.  Consistent information among population N; 
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3.  Zero restrictions on change from one identity to another;  
4.  That individuals wish to maximize E; 
5.  Identities x and y are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 
 
 
Benefits 
 
 
The specific types of benefits E that may be pursued instrumentally through ethnic 
identities and groups vary according to the level of our analysis. At level of personal 
interactions between ethnic kinsmen, we may surmise that benefits might broadly include 
favors, preferential treatment or prices, protection, employment, etc. Posner’s description 
of hypothetical identity change by a Kenyan market trader is illustrative of how perceived 
benefits might drive micro-level ethnic self-identification for instrumentalist scholars:  
 
A saleswoman in a Kenyan market might present herself as a Luo to a customer 
speaking that language (as her mother was a Luo-speaker), as a Kikuyu to a 
customer in an expensive suit (as her father was a Kikuyu), and as a Swahili to her 
neighbor in the market (as Kiswahili is the lingua franca of East African 
tradespeople). (2001: 15) 
 
 
At the macro (group) level, welfare outcomes associated with a particular ethnic identity 
mostly refer to what is commonly termed ‘pork’ (e.g. Fearon, 1999), the spoils of 
distributive politics for which it is assumed that each individual in a population will prefer 
more to less, but also to welfare outcomes more broadly. Furthermore, I distinguish 
between two types of welfare outcomes: Economic outcomes might refer to material 
resources, including government or bureaucratic employment, tax benefits, housing, 
general employment, education, healthcare and other provisions, etc; and Political 
outcomes, which are very much related to economic outcomes, but refer to political 
representation, legislated rights, etc.  
 
Taken together, we can say that, for instrumentalists: 
 
Ex = Po + Eo 
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Where: ‘Po’ indicates the value (subjective or objective) of current or potential political 
outcomes associated with ethnic identity x; and ‘Eo’ indicates the value of economic 
outcomes for x.  
 
2.12 – Restrictions  
 
In reality, it’s apparent that individuals are not in many cases free to switch at will between 
ethnic identities (and, thus, their corresponding groups). There are cases, however, when 
free switching is possible. Most notably, this may occur when an individual switches his or 
her active identification from one ethnic identity to another, where both are contained 
within that person’s repertoire of ethnic identities5 (Chandra, 2012d). This type of identity 
change is illustrated by Posner’s (2001) example cited above. The saleswoman is able to 
switch at will between Kikuyu, Luo and Swahili identities because all lie within her identity 
repertoire (i.e. she possesses and selectively displays the attributes which grant access to 
each ethnic group).  
 
In other cases, restrictions prevent the movement of people between ethnic groups.6 These 
restrictions may be attribute-specific (given by ‘Ra’ below) or systemic (given by ‘Rs’). By Ra I 
refer to the costs associated with switching between two mutually exclusive ethnic 
identities, which stem from the nature of the particular attributes that demarcate those 
identities in a given context. By Rs I refer to the costs affecting identity change that stem 
from the structure or institutions of that particular context. For example, an attribute-
specific restriction may be the inability to change one’s skin color or to learn a new 
language; and a systemic restriction may be manifested in codified rules of discrimination 
or segregation (such as ‘Jim Crow’ laws), or having a particular ethnic identity stated on 
one’s official documents, for example.  
 
                                                        
5 The extent of an individual’s repertoire is itself determined by (i) the attributes possessed by the 
individual, and (ii) the rules governing membership to a particular ethnic category i.e. the ethnic 
“boundary” in a given time and space.  
6 Caselli and Coleman (2013), for example, use the similar concept of ‘passing costs’ in their model 
of ethnic conflict; though their model is significantly more elaborate. 
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Total restrictions on change R between ethnic groups x and y may be given by: 
 
Rxy = (Rs + Ra)  
 
 
Clearly, it isn’t possible strictly to think about the value of these restrictions in terms of 
absolute numerical quantities. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that different types 
of systemic or attribute-specific restrictions will be more surmountable than others, along 
some continuum. For example, if membership to some imaginary ethnic group y were to be 
based around the collective, symbolic interpretation of the wearing of a yellow head-
garment as pertaining to notions of common descent (strange as this may sound), and 
therefore if my authentic displaying of such a garment would grant membership to the 
group, then this would seem to be a very inexpensive criterion for membership. If 
membership were to be based on such a criterion plus that pertaining to a group-specific 
language, then the cost of membership would increase, but membership would presumably 
remain attainable if mastery of the language to the required extent were feasible for the 
aspiring member, and if that person were to possess the required incentive to learn it.  
 
On the other hand, if membership required the head-garment plus the language plus some 
bodily feature, such as dark skin, then membership to group y may be prohibitively costly 
on average for those with light skin, save for those who might possess the means and 
incentives to consider some type of surgery. In general, we might say that morphological 
and other bodily criteria for group membership constitute the most costly attribute-
specific restrictions on change, with linguistic and complex customary or religious features 
being less so, and the simple wearing of garments or symbols being the least so. Similarly, 
for systemic restrictions, we might expect that the extent to which official documents, for 
example, can be altered over time, or bribed for, might determine the extent they prohibit 
identity change. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that any assessment of the relative costs of 
identity change will always be somewhat of an arbitrary affair, but thinking about these 
costs in terms of restrictions might provide a good framework within which we can be 
systematic about instrumentalist theory.  
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2.13 - Cleavages 
 
 
If ethnic identities (and their respective groups) are made salient because of their value to 
the pursuit of benefits, given by E, then what accounts for the persistence of ethnic 
cleavages that embody inequality? Clearly, if preferences are stable, the cleavage must be 
accounted for by costs imposed on the disadvantaged group, given by R, which prevent its 
members’ assimilation into the advantaged group. That is, if we accept the proposition of 
no intrinsic value to ethnic identities x and y; for the cleavage xy to persist where Ex > Ey, 
then: 
Rxy ≥ (Ex – Ey) 
 
 
i.e. the cost of switching is higher than (or equal to) the difference in payoffs between 
groups.  
 
Furthermore, it’s obvious that the value of the outcomes E associated with the advantaged 
group x are directly tied to the group’s ability to exclude, subject to the group’s obtaining 
the minimum size necessary to obtain resources. In the context of majoritarian electoral 
politics, incentives push the group towards approximating a minimal wining coalition 
of              people (Fearon, 1999), but in other contexts, only a plurality may be 
required to secure the group benefits while maximizing their per capita value, other things 
being equal. The precise ways in which different institutions affect ethnic group size is an 
interesting question in itself, but lies outside of the scope of the present study. For our 
purposes it is sufficient to note that the instrumental value of ethnic groups is directly 
related to their exclusivity, and that that their exclusivity is assured by way of costs, which 
are given in this model by R. Additionally, we may note that it is rational for members of an 
advantaged group to demarcate their ethnic boundary in such a way that prevents the 
group’s expansion. This is merely a more formalized expression of Barth’s (1969) 
observations about the strategic manipulation of ethnic group boundaries.   
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2.14 - Instrumentalist Expectations Concerning Aggregate Outcomes 
 
 
From the concepts outlined above, we can deduce several expectations regarding the 
rational activation of ethnic identities and the mobilization of ethnic groups, based on the 
relative values of costs and benefits. These instrumentalist expectations will be drawn upon 
in the case analyses that follow.  
 
Where: 
 
(i) Ex > Ey  and R = 0, individuals ACTIVATE identity x   
 (ii) Ex > Ey  and Rxy < (Ex – Ey) y individuals MOVE to group x 
 
Both of the above cases are assimilation strategies (into identity x, which has higher 
payoffs), however I distinguish between ‘activating’ and ‘moving’, because the latter entails 
bearing a cost to assimilate into one mutually exclusive group from another.  
 
Where: 
 
  (iii) Ex > Ey  and Rxy ≥ (Ex – Ey) an ethnic cleavage exists which is characterized by 
inequality. In this case, individuals in the disadvantaged group may have no choice but to 
MANAGE, since the cost of change to the advantaged group is prohibitively high. 
Alternatively, members of the disadvantaged group may also (iv) MOBILIZE in order to 
improve their position relative to the dominant group. It seems reasonable to expect that 
the ability of the disadvantaged group to mobilize is likely to be related to its relative size 
and to its coercive capacities, with very large groups probably standing the greatest chance 
of being able to challenge the dominant group.  
 
  
Figure 1. Summary of Instrumentalist Expectations for Members of Ethnic Group ‘y’ 
 
 
      Where: 
 
       Rxy < (Ex – Ey) 
 
        Rxy ≥ (Ex – Ey) 
 
        Ex > Ey 
 
ACTIVATE or MOVE 
 
MANAGE or MOBILIZE 
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2. 15 – Statement of Hypothesis 
 
 
Above, the stability of ethnic divisions that embody inequalities in political and economic 
outcomes between groups x and y results solely from the costs Rxy that prevent change.  
However, given that we can have some independent estimation of R by examining a 
particular context and ethnic cleavage, we may encounter a case where the cleavage xy 
persists despite:  
Rxy < (Ex – Ey) 
 
 
In this scenario, the persistence of the ethnic cleavage cannot be accounted for by the costs 
of change. For such a case, it would seem that some other factor is adding at least to the 
value of Ey. It is my hypothesis that such a factor exists, and that this ‘added value’ 
constitutes the intrinsic value of ethnic identity y, omitted by instrumentalist theories of 
ethnicity.  
 
By ‘intrinsic value,’ I am not suggesting a value attached to ethnicity that might be 
unaccountable, or unlinked to some alternative concept or theory, as the word ‘intrinsic’ 
might imply. What I am suggesting is simply that ethnicity, or ethnic group membership, 
might be valued in ways that supersede economic interests in the strict sense outlined 
above. Such a value could stem from particular symbolic codes or beliefs held by ethnic 
groups (this view, for instance, is expounded by Smith, 1992 to explain ethnic group 
persistence), or from the ‘values’ embodied in ethnic groups (see Varshney, 2003). No 
doubt, much could be extrapolated from the ethnicity literature that has been labeled 
‘primordialist’ to address this question equally. Regardless, I do not seek to speculate on 
this here, but merely hope to show that such a factor can be elucidated through the 
theoretical model I have constructed. Below, I discuss the methodology I have chosen for 
what follows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
2.2  - Methodology 
 
 
The empirical component of this research will take the form of case studies, as these permit 
the in-depth analysis necessary for addressing our central question, which is: whether 
ethnic group stability and change can be explained exclusively by instrumentalist accounts of 
ethnicity.  To guide and direct each case, I will deploy the model just outlined. 
 
 
2.21 – Case Selection 
 
I have selected to examine well-known and salient ethnic groups, about which there are 
ample data, whose persistence (or change) can be assessed in terms of R (restrictions on 
change) and E (the value of associated economic and political outcomes).  
 
In the interests of validity, I have refrained from selecting ethnic groups whose 
membership is determined by common religion, or by a common affiliation to a separate 
nation state (national diaspora groups). Although groups based on these criteria may 
legitimately be termed ‘ethnic’ (according to the terms of the definition detailed in section 
1.1), in each case the basis of group membership may unduly moderate or complicate a 
proper assessment of the calculus that may inform group action. In the case of ethnic 
groups based on common religion, it is highly plausible that the instrumental calculus may 
be based on perceived benefits that are seen to extend into the ‘afterlife’ (Varshney, 2003). 
Although this possibility in itself would contradict the economic instrumentalist 
expectations I have synthesized, and could therefore itself confirm my hypothesis, it would 
not add much to our scholarly understanding of ethnicity because religion may already be 
commonly regarded as a ‘special case.’ Similarly, I have not elected to study national 
diaspora groups because, again, the perceived benefits to membership in the group may be 
strongly distorted by forces from outside of the context in which the group acts and exists 
(e.g. the associative aspects of the diaspora - ‘home state’ connection).  
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I will look in the first place the ‘Yoruba’ ethnic identity in Nigeria. As an ethnic category 
with a high degree of 20th century salience within Nigerian politics, instrumentalist theory 
would expect that its development has been driven by its instrumentality to the pursuit of 
political and economic benefits (given by ‘E’). Moreover, because the Yoruba constitute an 
amalgam of sub-groups, I expect to find that the salience of the Yoruba identity illustrates 
the processes of ACTIVATION and/or MOVEMENT, as outlined above.   
 
In the second case, I will explore an historic ethnic cleavage that has embodied significant 
inter-group inequality: the ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ of Rwanda. I expect to find here that the 
cleavage has been facilitated by costs imposed on movement between groups (given by ‘R’). 
Here, therefore, I expect that this case will illustrate MANAGING and/or MOBILIZING on the 
part of the disadvantaged group.  
 
In the third case, I will examine the ‘Romani’. As a salient ethnic group that has persisted 
for centuries, instrumentalist theory would expect that the group’s endurance can be 
explained exclusively by the presence of either group benefits, or costs that have prevented 
their assimilation and dissolution. The Romani have, it would appear, endured through a 
variety of historical and institutional contexts, which enables interesting cross-temporal 
analysis. Given the centuries-long persistence of the Romani, it is here that my hypothesis, 
that ethnic group stability cannot in all cases be explained by way of welfare benefits or 
restrictions on change, will be tested. My expectation is that only by allowing for the 
Romani identity to be valued intrinsically can the persistence of the group be explained. 
Although Romani populations are spread over many countries throughout the world, they 
mostly cluster into the Central and Eastern European states. Given the limited scope and 
means of the present study, I will limit my analysis to Hungary, though historically I will 
refer to the much larger Kingdom of Hungary (up to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon). I have 
chosen Hungary specifically because (i) Romani communities have been consistently 
present in and around Hungary for several centuries, (ii) I have deemed that there is 
sufficient historical and contemporary data pertaining to Hungary, and (iii) as with 
neighboring countries and at the EU level, Romani issues have a high degree of relevance to 
contemporary policy making in Hungary.  
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For data, I rely primarily on secondary sources including monographs, edited volumes, 
articles from leading journals in the field, and PhD dissertations. Additionally, at times I 
utilize selected reports (e.g. from the EU Commission, Helsinki Watch, etc.), and make use 
of limited census and other demographic and economic data.      
 
2.22 – Levels of Analysis  
 
As already noted during the elaboration of my theoretical model, the operationalization of 
the variables E (political and economic benefits) and R (restrictions on change) will vary 
somewhat depending on our level of analysis. Instrumentalists consider that aggregate 
level outcomes, judged in terms of the objective saliency of ethnic groups, are the product 
of a calculus made at the individual level. The individual-level calculus, however, will in 
turn be affected by macro-level circumstances of the group. To work out whether ethnic 
group saliency at the aggregate level is in keeping with instrumentalist theory, I will 
explore the value of the political and economic outcomes associated with group 
membership (benefits), and will look at the characteristics of the group and the wider 
institutional context to assess restrictions on change between groups (costs).  
 
 
2.23 – Limitations 
 
 
By deploying my model, I will be somewhat constrained by its inherent limitations. Firstly, 
I will assume in my analysis that the relative values of benefits and restrictions are roughly 
constant for all members of the same ethnic group in the same context. In reality, this may 
not the case. Secondly and relatedly, because it is impossible to objectively and 
quantitatively measure these variables (or even to know exactly what constitutes them), it 
could be argued that the deployment of the model will be somewhat arbitrary. This point 
has some merit, but I believe my approach is still a good one on balance and addresses the 
research question with at least as much structure and validity as is commonly found 
elsewhere in the literature. Moreover, I will attempt to utilize plausible objective indicators 
of the relevant variables where possible.  
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3.1 – Where Benefits Beckon: The Making of the Yoruba 
 
 
 
The ‘Yoruba’ make up the second largest of Nigeria’s more than 250 ethnic groups, today 
comprising twenty-one percent of its population (CIA World Fact Book, 2014). They cluster 
predominantly into the country’s southwestern states, and are one of the three “mega-
tribes” to have dominated Nigeria’s sectarian politics since the formation of the modern 
Nigerian state, the other two being the ‘Igbo’ of the East, and the ‘Hausa-Fulani’ of the North 
(Peel, 1989). That these groups can be termed “mega-tribes” somewhat preempts the point 
to be made here. Though to varying extents and in different forms, each group represents 
an amalgam of subgroups that came under a collective ethnic label purely or mainly for 
instrumental purposes during the colonial period. What follows could therefore have taken 
any or all of the three main groups as its focus, but I will limit myself to the Yoruba in the 
interests of space.  
 
In his detailed portrait of the “Yoruba people,” Loyd notes that: “immigrant groups, 
conquerors from without and inter-kingdom wars within have all contributed to produce a 
kaleidoscopic pattern of culture and structure, that seems to defy classification into three 
or four basic types” (1965: 551). Given this, one could be forgiven for questioning the very 
premise of his attempt to classify the Yoruba as one. And yet, even a cursory glance at 
Nigerian politics and society during the 20th century makes it obvious that the Yoruba are, 
at once, a singular, meaningful ‘ethnic group’, and also a very internally divided set of, still 
meaningful, subgroups and allegiances, which can be made intelligible by considering the 
benefits that this pattern of association has brought to the individuals concerned. 
Specifically, this case illustrates how the distribution of benefits (in the form of economic 
and political outcomes) drives the selective activation of ethnic identity. Before I discuss 
the question why the Yoruba mobilized as such, it will first be necessary to discuss how the 
concept of a single Yoruba people came about, for this is a case not just of ethno-
instrumentalism, but also of ethno-genesis.  
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Construction 
 
The conceptual construction of a pan-Yoruba identity preceded its becoming popularly 
salient and politicized by many decades. Peel argues that the Yoruba first acquired the 
collective designation ‘Aku’ in the slave trade of Sierra Leone, “where a linguistically 
defined category emerged to embrace all Yoruba-speaking groups” (1989: 202). ‘Aku’ was 
later re-termed ‘Yoruba’ by Christian missionaries working in the Yoruba-speaking regions 
of western Nigeria in the early-19th century (ibid). The name was taken from the ‘Oyo-
Yoruba’, the largest of the fifty or so separate kingdoms (notably including the Ife, Ijebu, 
Ijesha and Ekiti) which constituted the area (Young, 1976). It’s widely acknowledged that 
these separate polities, although sharing some cultural and linguistic traits, had almost no 
sense of collective identity, frequently conducted slave-raids on each other’s territories, 
and were officially in a state of inter-tribal war for most of the 19th century (Peel, 1989; 
Young, 1976).  
 
Efforts to pacify the Yoruba-speaking kingdoms and to foster a pan-Yoruba identity were 
primarily driven by two successive forces and facilitated in a greater number of ways. The 
role of elites, first the Christian missionary intelligentsia and, later, Western-educated 
‘Yoruba’ elites, was decisive. The missionaries, many of whom were freed slaves who 
themselves had acquired a shared identity in captivity, constructed a generic literary 
Yoruba language and orthology, into which the scriptures could be translated (Peel, 1989). 
The missionaries also went about producing a written and highly deterministic 
reinterpretation of the history of the ‘Yoruba people’, which could serve as a unifying agent 
and a basis for the “inevitability of the future conversion of the Yoruba to Christianity” 
(Law, 1984: 197). The most famous and successful of these histories was that put together 
by Samuel Johnson, an ex-slave come Anglican missionary and priest, descended from the 
Oyo-Yoruba tribe (ibid). Johnson’s history, which builds a cohesive narrative of Oyo and 
non-Oyo tribes as descendants of ‘Oduduwa’, their common mythological king said to have 
been driven from Mecca, was not uncontroversial, notably because it took the Oyo as the 
Yoruba’s mythological center (ibid). Though written much earlier, the book was published 
in 1921 and has since been the subject of extensive historiographical scrutiny (see 
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Doortmont, 1994). Nevertheless, as Doortmont (1994) argues, its narrative formed the 
blueprint for much of the then-burgeoning Pan-Yoruba nationalism.  
 
Further fostering the concept of a singular Yoruba nation was the mode of ‘indirect’ 
governance favored by the British, who consolidated their position in the area in 1900, and 
unified the Southern and Northern Nigerian protectorates in 1914. As Cohen notes, the 
British sought to rule “as little and as cheaply as possible, [and to do so] the administration 
had to seek to understand native institutions, to preserve native groupings, to look for 
native ‘natural rulers’ in these groupings and to appoint these rulers as agents of the 
central administration” (1969: 113-114, italics added). Indirect rule thus necessarily 
involved simplifying and legitimizing supposedly distinct ‘national’ groups, each often 
corresponding to a particular stereotype and territory. In ‘Yorubaland,’ this involved 
recognition of the Oyo king by the British Governor of Lagos as “the head of Yorubaland, 
the four corners of which are and have been from time immemorial known as Egba, Ketu, 
Jebu, and Oyo, embracing within its area that inhabited by all Yoruba-speaking peoples” 
(Laitin, 1985: 304). 
 
Concomitant to the beginnings of the British colonial period, a Western-educated Yoruba 
elite that had formed mostly in Lagos moved to further elaborate the concept of a ‘pan-
Yoruba nation.’ Doortmont (1994) argues that this group was motivated to cohere under a 
common identity in response to the racial prejudice levied at them by the British. But aside 
from feelings of inferior status vis-à-vis the Europeans, this group had more material 
incentive to play up their distinct nationhood. As Ekeh notes, by doing so, this new 
“bourgeois elite” was able to “cement their influence within the new Nigeria” (1975: 105), 
notably, in the colonial administration (Doortmont, 1994).  
 
Through indirect rule, the British formalized the notion of a common Yorubaland as a 
distinct political entity, and the ‘Yoruba people’ as a distinct group. But importantly, despite 
the missionary’s construction of a pan-Yoruba ideal, replete with its linguistic and 
mythological unifiers, and the subsequent administrative impact of indirect rule, the pan-
Yoruba identity did not begin to crystallize en masse until it was invested with broad 
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political and economic benefits. This occurred as the colonial state advanced, and the 
various ‘national groups’, institutionalized by the British, began to interact within a 
common political structure.  
 
Benefits 
 
In the economic sphere, migrants from all over Nigeria started to cluster into the urban 
centers in search of employment by the 1920s and 30s, and inequalities between groups 
from different regions became apparent. This was especially the case in matters of 
education, which became a controversial issue because whatever group was ahead was 
seen to be able to monopolize the best jobs (Abernethy, 1969). In the Yoruba regions, Igbo 
migrants to Lagos and Ibadan were perceived by the native inhabitants as a particular 
economic threat7, and, faced with notions that the Yoruba were ‘inferior’, it was recognized 
that “only a purifying drive of pan-Yorubahood could bring spiritual renaissance” (Young, 
1976: 280). Nevertheless, unlike the Igbo and the Hausa-Fulani, whose internal unifications 
were effectively pursued early on, the various tribes comprising the Yoruba regions were 
prone to disunity and conflict well into the 20th century, mostly as a result of the internal 
animosity fostered by the British recognition of Oyo preeminence (Young, 1976). The drive 
to strengthen and unify the pan-Yoruba political consciousness within the Nigerian state 
manifested significantly in 1948, when the British-educated Obafemi Awolowo publicized 
the ‘Egbe Omo Oduduwa’8, a tribal union formed “for the men and women of Yoruba 
nationality” (Sklar, 1963: 68). One of the tasks of the ‘Egbe’ association was to provide for 
scholarships for Yoruba students and dedicated Yoruba schools (Abernethy, 1969). Among 
the general provisions laid out in the organization’s official constitution were the following 
stated aims:  
 
To unite the various clans and tribes in Yorubaland and generally create and 
                                                        
7 A fascinating, in-depth treatment of the ‘ethnic’ behaviors of Igbo economic migrants to 
Yorubaland is given by Peace (1980).  
8 ‘Egbe Omo Oduduwa’ translates as ‘Society of the Children of Oduduwa’ (Horowitz, 1977), 
building on the ancestral myth of King Oduduwa, which was elaborated and proselytized by Samuel 
Johnson, as already noted.  
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actively foster the idea of a single nationalism throughout Yorubaland […] To study 
fully its political problems, to plan for the rapid development of its political 
institutions, and to accelerate the emergence of a virile modernized and efficient 
Yoruba state with its own individuality within the Federal State of Nigeria [and] to 
study its economic resources, to ascertain its economic potentialities and to advise 
as to the wisest utilization of its wealth, so as to ensure abundance and prosperity 
for its people. (Sklar, 1963: 68) 
 
 
Subsequently, the personnel of the ‘Egbe’ travelled throughout the Yoruba provinces, 
convincing leading tribal chiefs to become patrons of the organization. As Sklar notes, its 
ranks were filled with the rising class of “lawyers, doctors, businessmen, civil servants, and 
certain far-sighted chiefs, who perceived that the locus of their economic and political 
power was not local but regional and national” (1963: 72). It’s no coincidence that the 
establishment of the ‘Egbe’ occurred shortly following the 1946 constitution, which divided 
the country into Western, Eastern and Northern regions. As Akanji notes, this arrangement 
served to greatly engender “the use of ethnicity and indigeneity by the regional 
governments in the determination of peoples’ rights and privileges; ethnicity became the 
criterion for determining access to political power and political patronage in each of the 
three regions” (2011: 120). The tri-regional structure dramatically incentivized Nigerian 
politics into what Young (1976: 292) called a “three player political game,” as each region 
mostly coincided with large majorities of each of the three ‘mega-tribes’. But the wide-scale 
active mobilization of the pan-Yoruba identity was not made fully necessary until the 1951 
constitution, which enfranchised millions of new voters. Unsurprisingly then, this closely 
coincided with the formation the ‘Action Group’, the political party arm of ‘Egbe’, also 
founded by Awolowo (Sklar, 1963). These sectarian incentives were further entrenched by 
the constitutions of 1954, and the independence constitution of 1960. In the case of the 
1954 edition, especially, the ‘regionalization’ of the Nigerian civil service provided for the 
regional exclusion of ‘strangers’, or people who were not members of the ‘native 
communities’ living in the area of a particular authority (Akanji, 2011), further increasing 
the value of the economic outcomes associated with the pan-Yoruba identity.  
 
With the federal structure established in 1946 and after, the political and economic 
instrumentality of the pan-Yoruba ethnic identity was entrenched. This value has, no doubt, 
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waned given the various federal alterations that began in 1967 with the portioning of the 
three former regions into twelve states (Young, 1976). A full treatment of the extent of pan-
Yoruba ethnic mobilization after independence is beyond our scope here. It is sufficient for 
our purposes merely to note that, firstly, a pan-Yoruba ethnic identity did not effectively 
exist prior to colonial rule. Secondly, that the activation and mobilization of this ‘ethnic 
group’ occurred only once it was invested with instrumental value within the context of the 
cosmopolitan colonial state. And thirdly (and crucially), that the instrumentality of a pan-
Yoruba ethnic identity derives solely vis-à-vis the Nigerian state and its national and 
federal institutions. Within Yorubaland and among the Yoruba, local sub-Yoruba ethnic 
identifications persist, principally, in the form of ancestral city identifications.  
 
 
Yoruba Sub-groups and Selective Activation 
 
Laitin (1985) provides a detailed account of the nature of these sub-Yoruba identifications, 
which mostly correspond to the various kingdoms of the pre-colonial period, such as Oyo-
Ife and Ibadan. Despite the emergence of a pan-Yoruba identity over the last century, Laitin 
contends “the ancestral city remains today the central basis for political mobilization 
within the Yoruba states of the Nigerian Federation” (1985: 291). He adds: 
 
Yorubas who live in the anomic cosmopolitan centers like Ibadan or Lagos derive 
great pleasure on return to their ancestral city from seeing people bow to them at 
every encounter and having ‘praise singers’ follow them through the town, 
immortalizing their origins and their worldly successes. These sons of the ancestral 
city want to keep alive to the king of their town their claim to a prime plot of land 
for a retirement home or for a status home for their relatives. (Laitin, 1985: 291) 
 
 
Within the Yoruba regions, the persistence of sub-Yoruba ethnic groupings defined 
according to decent from a common ‘ancestral’ city can be explained by the benefits that 
the ancestral-city identification brings to individuals. Traditionally, the economic benefits 
associated with ancestral city identification have manifested in terms of land. Until the 
Land Decree of 1978, for example, Yoruba kings could promise land to non-resident ‘sons 
of the town’ (Laitin, 1985). Moreover, each Yoruba ancestral city has traditionally 
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emphasized a strict dichotomy between ‘natives’, those descended from the town, and 
‘settlers’ who were prevented from owning land and were subject to ceremonial displays of 
foreignness9 (Akanji, 2011). Other modern economic benefits tied to one’s ancestral city 
include preferential treatment in admission to regional universities, where indigenes are 
often given reduced tuition fees and greater access to scholarships and grants (ibid). 
Additionally, in the political sphere, the native-settler dichotomy within Yoruba regions 
and affinity to ancestral towns has been fostered by successive Nigerian constitutions. As 
Akanji notes, “only people who are indigenes of a particular state/community can be 
considered for political appointment by the federal government to represent ‘their’ 
state/community. Incidentally, a similar scenario plays out at the micro level, where 
political appointments must reflect the indigenous identity of the members of the State or 
the local government council” (2011: 124). These provisions limit the extent to which those 
whose grandparents were not indigenous to a particular community can represent the 
states in which they reside (ibid), which serves to greatly accentuate the value of the 
political outcomes associated with one’s ancestral city.  
 
 
Figure 2. Characterization of ethnic identity change between ‘pan-Yoruba’ and ‘ancestral city’ 
 
 
 
In sum, the conception of the Yoruba-speaking peoples of southwestern Nigeria as a 
distinct ‘ethnic group’ is a very modern phenomenon. Christian missionaries laid down its 
common mythological and linguistic foundations in the 19th century, and the pan-Yoruba 
                                                        
9 Interestingly, the restrictions on owning land and the ‘native’ ‘settler’ dichotomy can be said to 
serve as a traditional intra-Yoruba systemic restriction, preventing change in an individual’s 
identification from one ancestral city to another, and thus maintaining the exclusivity of the 
ancestral-city group.  
10 R=0 where both identities are contained within the same identity repertoire, as discussed in 
model above.  
      Vis-à-vis cosmopolitan cities & national institutions 
 
E pan-Yoruba   > E ancestral-city 
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identity was subsequently invested with political and economic value within the context of 
the colonial state, whereupon its mobilization took place. Effectively, pan-Yorubahood 
represented a new, overarching ethnic identity, nominally based on the shared 
interpretation of linguistic and cultural commonalities, underpinned by a common 
ancestral myth and made salient by the redefinition of territory within the new Nigerian 
polity. The pan-Yoruba identity was therefore added to the repertoires of the Yoruba-
speaking peoples. As such, this identity can be selectively activated cost-free when it is 
expedient to do so; that is, in the cosmopolitan cities and in the national and federal 
institutions, that bring ‘Yorubas’ in opposition to and competition with members of the 
other ‘mega-tribes’. Within Yorubaland, exclusive, sub-Yoruba identities based on ancestral 
city persist, as these continue to provide individuals with significant benefits, economically, 
politically and socially (this pattern of identity change is depicted in figure 2 above). On a 
final note, within Yorubaland, this pattern of association in many ways parallels Ekeh’s 
(1975) discussion of the dialectic between a ‘civil’ and a ‘primordial’ public. Pan-
Yorubahood seems clearly to be a very civil construct, consciously formed and 
instrumentally employed as a political project in new federal Nigeria. Whereas the 
ancestral-city identification seems more imbued with ritual symbolism and status meaning, 
although importantly, it still can be accounted for by reference to material political and 
economic benefits. Whatever the residual value contained within the ancestral city 
identification, it has not yet been fully brought into relief.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
3.2 – Dichotomous Inequality in Rwanda: The Role of Restrictions 
 
 
 
The genocide that occurred exactly twenty years ago in Rwanda, in which approximately 
800,000 people were slaughtered over one hundred days, was certainly the product of 
many interrelating social, political and economic dynamics. At its core, however, was one of 
the starkest and most prejudicial ethnic cleavages borne out by the 20th century, that 
between ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’. Colonial rule, first by Germany and later by Belgium, did not 
create these categories, but, as will be discussed below, it did redefine them in a 
fundamental way. During the colonial period, the total political and economic subjugation 
of the majority Hutu by the minority Tutsi was facilitated by a newly rigidified ethnic 
boundary. Nearing the end of the Belgium colonial period and upon independence, the 
same constructed ethnic boundary was employed by the Hutu to consolidate their 
newfound preeminence. Before and after independence, therefore, severe inter-group 
inequality was contingent on the imposition of costs, in the form of restrictions on change 
between groups, which were in turn based upon the colonial definitions of ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’. In each case, the group finding itself in the subjugated position would have no 
choice but to manage or, as it will be shown, to mobilize where circumstances permitted.  
 
 
Hutu and Tutsi in Pre-colonial Rwanda 
 
Sadowski offers the following synopsis of the Hutu/Tutsi distinction preceding colonial 
rule:  
 
When Europeans first stumbled across [Rwanda], most of the country was already 
united under a central monarchy whose inhabitants spoke the same language, 
shared the same cuisine and culture, and practiced the same religion. They were, 
however, divided into several castes. The largest group, the Hutu, were farmers. The 
ruling aristocracy, who collected tribute from all other groups, was recruited from 
the Tutsis, the caste of cattle herders. All groups supplied troops for their common 
king, and intermarriage was not unusual. Social mobility among castes was quite 
possible: a rich Hutu who purchased enough cattle could climb into the ranks of the 
Tutsi; and impoverished Tutsi could fall into the ranks of the Hutu. Anthropologists 
considered all castes to be members of a single “tribe,” the Banyarwanda. (1998: 14) 
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Though somewhat stylized, this account is accurate nonetheless. As Mamdani notes, though 
it is plausible that the ancestral origins of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ may correlate with various 
separate migrations to Africa’s Great Lakes region, a single “cultural community” was 
created in what is modern-day Rwanda “through centuries of cohabitation, intermarriage 
and cultural exchange” (2001: 74). As is well acknowledged in the literature, the boundary 
between the Hutu and Tutsi was a porous and overtly political one in the pre-colonial 
period, primarily defined in terms of socioeconomic status. The ceremonial rise of an 
individual from Hutu to Tutsi ranks was termed “kwihutura,” while the fall of a Tutsi into 
the Hutu was called “gucupira” (ibid). As such, preceding the colonial period, it is highly 
contestable whether the Hutu and Tutsi could be called ‘ethnic’ groups at all, at least 
according to the definition I have adopted above. To be sure, patrilineal decent, in the 
absence of other factors, determined one’s identity as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa11, but such a 
designation was not cemented for life and notions of decent (‘per se’ or stemming from any 
cultural, bodily or linguistic trait) were not essential to one’s group identity (d’Hertefelt, 
1963). Moreover, prior to colonial rule, the Hutu were not entirely subjugated to the Tutsi, 
though they were clearly deemed the ‘inferior’ class. Hutus were permitted to hold low-
level administrative positions, and roughly a third of the country’s ‘chiefs’ were Hutu, these 
chiefs playing a key role in the distribution of justice among other Hutus (d’Hertefelt, 
1963). The Hutu were also historically considered to be the bearers of ‘supernatural’ 
powers, which, together with Tutsi ‘military’ powers, were held as core institutions within 
the historical Rwandan monarchy (Mamdani, 2001).  
 
 
Redefinition and Inequality 
 
The crucial redefinition ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ occurred gradually over the course of colonial 
                                                        
11 The ‘Twa’ formed the lowest of the three classes in pre-colonial Rwanda. They were largely 
associated with hunting and gathering, and inhabited the mountainous forests of northern and 
western Rwanda. In 1959 they comprised less than one percent of the population (d’Hertefelt, 
1963). 
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rule in the first decades of the 20th century. Though with different means and to different 
ends, the reconstruction of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ took place in a way not totally dissimilar to 
the construction of the pan-Yoruba identity discussed above. It was first an intellectual 
project taken on by missionaries, though this time they were European Catholic 
missionaries, and once the intellectual foundations were established, the reinterpreted 
identities were formalized and institutionalized within the colonial state.  
 
As Mamdani (2001) discusses, underscoring the ‘racialization’ of the Hutu and Tutsi was 
the ‘Hamitic hypothesis,’ that was central to the European ‘civilizing’ mission in Africa. This 
view, first applied in the Rwandan context in the latter part of the 19th century,12 held that 
wherever there were signs of civilized state life on the African continent, the ruling class 
must have come from elsewhere and been ‘racially’ separate from their subordinates. This 
led to missionaries actively seeking out stark physical and other differences between the 
various ‘races,’ where few or none had previously been salient (ibid). As such, the Tutsis 
were deemed by the church and prominent physical anthropologists as a “civilizing and 
alien race [from the larger population]… superb humans…combining traits both Aryan and 
Semitic” (Mamdani, 2001: 86). It’s worth noting here that Tutsi elites were not merely 
passive as this occurred. Des Forges, for instance, has called Hutu/Tutsi racialization a 
“collaborative enterprise,” with Tutsi chiefs, poets and court historians working early on 
with colonial administrators and the Catholic Church to develop a Hamitic “mythic history 
to buttress a colonial social order” (1995: 45) (and therefore to buttress their own 
preeminence over Hutus). The myth, which became entrenched within the oral histories of 
both Hutu and Tutsi in the 20th century, expounded that the Tutsi had migrated from 
Ethiopia centuries ago, and “had subjugated the far more numerous mass through their 
martial skill and superior intelligence” (Des Forges, 1995: 45). 
 
Recognition of the ruling Tutsi elite as ‘racially’ alien from and superior to the majority 
                                                        
12 The Hamitic hypothesis has its roots in religious doctrine, which perhaps explains why the 
missionaries so exuberantly applied it. Originally, the ‘Hamites’ (black Africans) were seen as the 
‘accursed’ descendants of the biblical figure ‘Ham.’ This myth was later revised so that Hamites 
became the civilized decedents of ‘Causations’, while ‘Negroids’ were the uncivilized degenerates 
formerly termed ‘Hamitic’ (Mamdani, 2001).  
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‘Bantu’ Hutu population fitted conveniently with the German mode of indirect rule, which 
began in Rwanda in 1897 (Niazi, 2005). Aside from their endorsement of a racial ideology 
underpinning the Hutu/Tutsi divide, the other key German contribution was that they 
facilitated the consolidation of Rwandan state control over the Northern parts of the 
country, which had previously been quite weak. Importantly, the Germans then imposed 
Tutsi chiefs on these areas, where Hutus had previously been prominent (ibid). Sensing a 
change in the Hutu/ Tutsi dynamic, it’s notable here that in 1911 resentment against the 
Germans, the Tutsis and the Catholic Church led to a popular Hutu uprising in northern 
Rwanda, though this was quickly put down (ibid). But aside from these points, the Germans 
did not significantly alter the traditional institutions of the Rwandan state, so their role 
should not be overstated.  
 
The Hutu/Tutsi racialization project was significantly elaborated during Belgium colonial 
rule, which began following World War One under a League of Nations mandate (Niazi, 
2005). Drawing on the ‘expertise’ accrued by the Catholic Church in Rwanda, the Belgians 
took the Hamitic vision of Tutsi racial supremacy and comprehensively integrated it into 
the country’s core institutions over the course of the 1920s and 30s, dramatically 
exacerbating the political and economic disparity between Hutu and Tutsi identities. 
Firstly, modern education, which was administered mostly through the missions, became 
largely restricted to the Tutsi ranks, with Hutus given separate ‘inferior’ education taught 
in Kiswahili as opposed to French (ibid). The separatist education intended not only to 
prepare the Hutus for manual labor, but also to “underscore the political fact that educated 
Hutu were not destined for common citizenship” (Mamdani, 2001: 90). Secondly, the 
system of local administration was significantly altered. The powers of local chiefs were 
extended, while the traditional structures of accountability to their communities that had 
existed were removed, making chiefs accountable only to Belgian administrators. All Hutu 
chiefs were systematically removed from their posts and replaced with Tutsis, many of 
whom were the products of the missionary schools and had been “nourished on a diet of 
Hamitic supremacy” (Mamdani, 2001: 91). Through these chiefs, the complete economic 
subjugation of Hutus was ensured. As well as bearing the brunt of colonial taxation, 
infrastructure projects and most agricultural production became significantly reliant on the 
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forced labor of Hutus, which had been codified in law from 1924 (ibid). And thirdly, 
following the Native Tribunals reform in 1936, the chiefs were invested with near total 
judicial power over their subordinates and were able to enact any by-law that did not 
violate existing colonial directives, greatly fostering the ‘local despotism’ that had taken 
hold (ibid). 
 
The Cementing of the Boundary 
 
By the end of the 1920s, it’s clear that the political and economic inequality between Hutu 
and Tutsi was drastic, and Hutu subservience was entrenched far more profoundly than 
had been the case in pre-colonial Rwanda. But crucially, the effective, totalistic 
subordination of Hutus required a hardened clarity over who was Hutu and who was Tutsi. 
Through the Hamitic racialization process, the colonial authorities had introduced both 
mythological and physical interpretations of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi,’ and these were encouraged 
and elaborated through colonial institutions (as noted above), fundamentally changing the 
nature of the inter-group boundary. Physical stereotypes now acted as attribute-specific 
restrictions, greatly inhibiting movement across the Hutu/Tutsi boundary. Nevertheless, 
it’s likely that, from the perspective of the colonial administration, enough ambiguity 
existed around Hutu and Tutsi that they were compelled to definitively categorize each 
individual in the population (Mamdani, 2001). This occurred with the official census of 
1933-34, during which each individual was issued with an identity card clearly labeling 
their race as ‘Mututsi,’ ‘Muhutu,’ or ‘Mutwa’ (Fussell, 2001). Interestingly, the variety of 
processes by which individuals were designated to a particular race evidences the 
arbitrariness of these categories. In many cases, physical measurements of height and 
nose-width were used, but the inconclusiveness of these measurements often meant that 
the Belgians were forced to use the ownership of cows13 as the basis for categorization 
(African Rights, 1995). At other times, they simply relied on oral information provided by 
local clergy (Mamdani, 2001).  
 
                                                        
13 This involved what has been termed the ‘ten cow rule,’ by which those with ten or more cows 
were deemed ‘Tutsi’ (with their decedents), while those with less were ‘Hutu’ (Mamdani, 2001).  
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With the introduction of identity cards, the boundary between Hutu and Tutsi was finally 
cemented, the official and definitive designation acting as a crucial systemic 
(institutionalized) restriction on identity change. After 1933, “gucupira” and “kwihutura” 
were officially no longer possible, with ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ considered legally immutable 
categories for the first time in the history of the Rwandan state (Mamdani, 2001). The 
Rwandan census of 1933-34, therefore, marked the final stage in the racialization or, more 
broadly, the ethnicization of Hutu and Tutsi as two mutually exclusive ethnic groups, each 
perceived as having their own distinct mythologies and characteristics. For roughly the 
next decade and a half, the coercive apparatus of the Belgian colonial state endorsed the 
subjugation of a group comprising 85 percent of the Rwandan population by a group 
comprising no more than 14 percent (ibid). What is highly instructive about the Rwandan 
case, however, is that once this endorsement wavered (and was finally removed following 
Rwandan independence), the formerly inferior group would employ the very same ethnic 
interpretations to both justify and facilitate their subjugation of Tutsis.  
 
 
The Turning of Tables 
 
During most of Belgian colonial rule, the Hutu population had little choice but to manage 
their inferior status vis-à-vis the Tutsi. But, from the mid 1950s, a growing Hutu elite began 
to mobilize, calling for democratization and the redistribution of resources from Tutsis to 
Hutus, producing the ‘Hutu Manifesto’ of 1957 (Newbury, 1998). Paralleling the mode by 
which Tutsi racial supremacy had been established decades earlier, Hutu calls for equality 
were buttressed by a change of heart on the part of the Catholic Church, and on the part of 
the Belgian authorities, who sought increasingly to encourage democratization in 
preparation for Rwanda’s decolonization (ibid). The Tutsi elite, however, met the calls for 
the redistribution of land and political power mostly with hostility, which in turn fostered 
still greater animosity on the part of Hutus (ibid). Between 1959 and 1961, the nature of 
political mobilizations on both sides became increasingly extreme, and violence between 
the groups was frequent. The leading Hutu voice to emerge was that of Grégoire Kayibanda, 
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one of the nine authors of the Hutu Manifesto and founder of ‘MDR-PARMEHUTU14’, the 
Hutu ‘emancipation’ party that, with Kayibanda as its head, would come to dominate the 
politics of the new Republic of Rwanda from 1961 until his overthrow in 1973 (Mamdani, 
2001).   
 
A full survey of post-colonial Rwandan politics is beyond our scope here. For our purposes 
it is sufficient to note that successive post-1961 Rwandan governments, first led by 
Kayibanda and then by Juvénal Habyarimana following the military coup of 1973, did not 
dispense with the artificial, colonial ‘racial’ divide and inequality, but rather sought to turn 
it on its head. The independent Rwandan state thus formed a “reversal of the monarchical 
and colonial social hierarchy” (Hintjens, 2001: 33). Centrally underpinning the dominant 
post-colonial political discourse was the continued colonial racial mythology that the Hutu 
were the indigenous ‘Bantu’ people who had been subjugated by an alien Hamitic ‘Tutsi’ 
people (Mamdani, 2001). This notion, that the Hutu comprised an internally homogenous 
‘race’ of separate ‘native’ Rwandans, formed the legitimizing basis for many exclusionary 
policies. Civil service jobs and admissions to post-secondary school institutions became 
heavily restricted to Hutus, while Tutsi were almost entirely prevented from obtaining 
positions in government (ibid). Seen as ‘resident-aliens,’ independent Rwanda’s Tutsi were 
deemed “politically illegitimate” (Mamdani, 2001: 134). Moreover, the very stereotypes 
that were formed to underscore Tutsi preeminence under colonial rule, that they possessed 
‘superior’ and ‘devious’ capacities (Des Forges, 1995), came to be employed and elaborated 
by Hutu ‘exclusivist’ politicians (Mamdani, 2001). Thus, the mythological discourse and 
imagery that had once served Tutsi interests now greatly hindered them. Interestingly, in 
the imagery of the hate-filled ‘Ten Commandments,’ a document that expounded the 
ideology of ‘Hutu Power’ preceding the genocide of 1994, the colonial basis for many of the 
negative Tutsi stereotypes are clearly in evidence. Hutu women, for example, were urged to 
rescue their men from the clutches of scheming “Hamitic Eves” (Hintjens, 2001: 43). 
 
In the same way that the colonial order required definitive clarity over who was ‘Hutu’ and 
                                                        
14 MDR-PARMEHUTU is an abbreviation for “Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais/ Partie du 
Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu” (Mamdani, 2001: 121).  
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who was ‘Tutsi,’ so did the racial subordination of Tutsi in the post-colonial order. Hutu 
plans to keep racial identity cards in place were made explicit as early as in the 1957 Hutu 
Manifesto, wherein it was stated that: 
 
We are opposed vigorously, at least for the moment, to the suppression in the 
official or private identity papers of the mentions 'Muhutu', 'Mututsi', 'Mutwa'. Their 
suppression would create a risk of preventing the statistical law from establishing 
the reality of facts. (in Fussell, 2001: 9)  
 
 
As Fussell (2001) has noted, by “statistical law” the authors clearly refer to the statistical 
dominance of the Hutu majority. With the continuance of racial identity cards, therefore, 
the boundary between Hutu and Tutsi remained cemented after independence. That is to 
say, despite a stark reversal in the value of political and economic outcomes attached to 
‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ after independence, and thus the reversal of incentives for individuals to 
hold these identities, systemic restrictions on change remained firmly in place. Again, an 
institution that had previously served Tutsi interests now served to hinder them15.  
 
Just as Hutus for most of colonial rule had little choice but to manage (given that the Tutsi 
position was ensured both by the indigenous military and by the apparatus of the colonial 
state), the reality of the Tutsi minority without colonial endorsement was that they would 
have, for the most part, no choice but to manage in their post-colonial situation. This was 
certainly the case for Tutsis living under Hutu dominance within Rwanda. Nevertheless, the 
various efforts of Tutsis who had fled to Burundi and Uganda to form political and military 
opposition to Hutu control in Rwanda can be interpreted as manifestations of mobilization 
strategies, most notably culminating in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which invaded 
Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 (Mamdani, 2001). Many other efforts from exiled Tutsis to 
oppose Hutu dominance in Rwanda could be mentioned, including the host of military raids 
conducted by Tutsis from the Burundian border in the early 1960s (Hintjens, 2001) and the 
                                                        
15 The ‘racial’ designation on Rwandan national ID cards was not removed until 1997.  According to 
Fussell (2001), they played a key function in the 1994 genocide, with Hutu soldiers given orders to 
collect the Tutsi identifications from their victims and to supply them to their superiors. 
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many guerilla raids into Rwanda during the 1980s (Mamdani, 2001).16 
 
 
Figure 3. Characterization of Hutu/Tutsi inter-group inequality pre & post independence 
 
COLONIAL RWANDA 
 
E Tutsi > E Hutu   AND  R ≥ (E Tutsi - E Hutu) 
 
Hutus MANAGE 
(MOBILIZE, post 1957) 
 
POST-COLONIAL RWANDA 
 
E Hutu > E Tutsi    AND   R ≥ (E Hutu - E Tutsi) 
 
Tutsis MANAGE 
(some MOBILIZE, efforts from diaspora) 
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, although I have necessarily simplified the above account, I have sought to illustrate 
several inter-ethnic dynamics that are congruent with the instrumentalist model, which I 
characterize in figure 3. Like the Yoruba case above, the construction of ethnic identity 
(‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’) is evidenced in the Rwandan case. But more crucially, and as the 
instrumentalist model would expect, the Rwandan case illustrates how an ethnic cleavage 
embodying substantial inter-group inequality can be accounted for by the imposition of 
costs, given by attribute and systemic restrictions on identity change, which inhibit inter-
group assimilation. In this case, systemic restrictions have probably been most significant, 
given the flimsy basis on which physical stereotypes of Hutu and Tutsi were drawn.  
 
Prior to colonial rule, the boundary between ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ was highly permeable and of 
a socioeconomic, rather than ‘ethnic’, nature. The people who lived under the jurisdiction 
of the pre-colonial monarchy, while divided by class and status, comprised a singular 
cultural, linguistic and religious group and were not divided by separate mythologies or 
                                                        
16 A tangential but interesting question here is why those diaspora Tutsis, who had fled Rwanda in 
successive waves from the 1960s, would rationally seek to mobilize against the Rwandan Hutu 
rather than simply assimilating into their host societies? This is especially pertinent in the Ugandan 
case, where ‘Hutu/Tutsi’ distinctions were not applicable, and therefore probably not inhibitive. 
Mamdani (2001: 159-184) provides a tentative answer by pointing to the fact that notions of 
‘indigeneity’ were salient in Ugandan politics. Thus, ironically, the Tutsi diaspora were largely 
excluded in Uganda for similar reasons as those underpinning Hutu ‘native’ supremacy in Rwanda.  
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group-specific phenotypical interpretations. Under colonial rule, by Germany and then by 
Belgium, the groups came to be ethnicized or ‘racialized’ through a process that involved 
the construction and active affirmation of separate mythologies and physical stereotypes. 
‘Racial’ differences were institutionalized within the colonial state and so was the total 
economic and political subjugation of Hutus. With this, colonial, racial ideologies came to be 
internalized by both groups, and the boundary between them was cemented by the 1933-
34 census and the introduction of racial identity cards, which served as the ultimate 
systemic restriction on identity change. Given Tutsi endorsement by the coercive apparatus 
of the colonial state, Hutus, for most of this time, had little choice but to manage in their 
subordinate state, notwithstanding attempts to mobilize during the colonial twilight.  
 
Post-independence, this situation was essentially reversed. Unchecked by the colonial 
state, the overwhelming Hutu majority perpetuated the colonial racial dichotomy but 
inverted its outcomes. Tutsis became the subordinate minority and the inter-ethnic 
boundary remained cemented through mandatory racial identification by the state and the 
perpetuation of ‘ethnic’ group stereotypes. It was now the Tutsis who, for the most part, 
had little choice but to manage in their downtrodden position, though several notable anti-
Hutu mobilizations were launched, mostly by the efforts of Tutsi diaspora.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
3.3 – The Romani: A Deviant Case? 
 
 
The Romani17 constitute an internationally dispersed, non-territorial people, who number 
about 12 million worldwide, but who cluster significantly into the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Their transnational dispersion over centuries and their mixed socio-
historical experiences have led to a significant degree of in-group division18. Nevertheless, 
though each sub-group may have its own customary particularisms and name (such as 
‘Sinti’, ‘Manush’, ‘Vlax’ or ‘Kalderaš’,) and intra-Romani solidarity has been frequently 
called into question, all share (or have shared) common linguistic and cultural markers, 
and all are said to maintain an ethnic dichotomy between themselves as ‘Romani’, and 
those who are ‘gadže’ (non-Romani) (Hancock, 2002). It is a historical truism that the 
origins and identity of the Romani have been the subject of widespread erroneous 
speculation and suspicion, evidenced by the selection of names used to describe them, such 
as ‘Gypsies’ (Egyptians), ‘Tattare’ (Tartars), ‘Heiden’ (Heathens), ‘Turks’, or ‘Tsingani’ (from 
Byzantine Greek for ‘hands off’), to name a few (Hancock, 2002). Despite this, historical, 
linguistic19 and genetic research conducted on the various Romani sub-groups, mostly 
during the 20th century, has convincingly shown that they are the descendants of a distinct 
exodus from India that took place around 1000 AD. Their ancestors were probably 
affiliated with or a part of the military ‘Rajput’ tribes, and have been linked with the 
modern day ‘Banjara’ in Northern India (ibid).  
 
It is another truism that, whatever internal complexity and diversity characterizes the 
                                                        
17 I use the names ‘Romani’ (or ‘Romanies’) as opposed to ‘Roma’ or ‘Romany,’ following the advice 
of Hancock (2002).  
18 The diversity of Romani sub-groups and their designations is extremely complex. Names of 
various sub-groups and tribes derive mostly either from the regions or professions to which 
particular communities are (or were) associated. E.g. ‘Vlax’ or ‘Vlachi’ comes from ‘Wallachia’, 
whereas the designation ‘Kalderaš’ comes from the Romani word for cauldron maker. They are also 
internally sub-divided according to language spoken, or by Romani dialect, and by their levels of 
integration into various societies (ROMBASE, 2003). 
19 Interestingly, the first link between the Romani and India was made informally at Leiden 
University in 1760, when a Hungarian theology student noted a similarity between the speech of 
two visiting Indian students, and the Romani laborers who worked on his family’s estate (Hancock, 
2002).  
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Romani, they have, as a group, been more or less consistently subject to varyingly extreme 
forms of prejudice, subjugation and marginalization across time and space. Notably, the 
Romani endured five centuries of slavery in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia 
(modern Romania, between the 1300s and 1856) (Fraser, 1992), and up to 1.5 million 
Romani were killed during the Nazi ‘Porajmos’ (Romani for ‘devouring’) (Hancock, 2002). 
And yet, despite the perils that being Romani has so often brought, this ethnic group has 
persisted for centuries. Moreover, not only are the Romani still very much a salient ethnic 
group, but their continued marginalization and deprivation is, according to the European 
Commission, “the most serious social challenge in Europe” (2011: 14). In almost every 
European country with a noteworthy Romani population, they face worse outcomes than 
non-Romanies on indicators such as poverty, education, healthcare, employment prospects, 
housing standards and life expectancy (which, for Romani across the EU, is ten years below 
the average) (ibid). So what explains the persistence of the Romani? Has the rational 
dissolution of this disadvantaged group merely been impeded by costs, in the form of 
restrictions on identity change? With the distribution of the Romani across time and space 
as complex as it is, I cannot hope to fully address this question here. Below, I will consider 
the costs and benefits pertaining to the persistence of the Romani over the course of their 
history in Hungary (historically, I refer to the Kingdom of Hungary). It will be shown that 
restrictions on change provide only part of the answer.  
 
 
Early Experiences  
 
By the time the Romani began to migrate westwards from the Byzantine Empire in the 14th 
century, they had acquired somewhat of a reputation as fortune-tellers (which exploited 
the widespread superstition of the day), musicians, bear-trainers and jugglers, professions 
which were agreeable to their transient lives (Hancock, 2002). Subsequently, various 
Romani groups became skilled metal-smiths, cobblers and the like, these trades in turn 
often lending their names to various Romani sub-groups (Fraser, 1992).  
 
The Romani first reached the Kingdom of Hungary in significant numbers probably after 
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the 1430s, and it may be fair to say that their early experiences were not particularly 
negative by the standard of the times, that is, vis-à-vis the lives of ordinary peasants, who 
were greatly oppressed in Hungary and elsewhere in central Europe (Fraser, 1992). It 
could even be said that, for a time, the Romani enjoyed a rather favored position from the 
perspective of the authorities. This is principally because many Romani quickly acquired a 
positive reputation utilizing their skills, especially as smiths but also as musicians, to the 
extent that Matthias I declared them royal servants “for whose settlement and employment 
on private estates the consent of the King was necessary” (Fraser, 1992: 109). This special 
treatment continued under Vladius II, and Romani weapons-smiths would later work 
closely with János Zápolya (later, King John II), for whom they made musket balls and other 
weapons (ibid). Notably, Romani smiths were instrumental to Zápolya’s efforts to put down 
a peasant rebellion in 1514, and specially constructed the instruments of torture (and red-
hot iron crown and thrown) used on the revolt’s leader. When Zápolya was crowned king 
in 1538, one of his first acts was to grant ‘Gypsy liberties’ (ibid).  
 
Thus, with their expertise in metalworking and other crafts, many Romani in the Kingdom 
of Hungary were able to carve out quite a beneficial ecological niche and were viewed 
favorably by successive monarchs. We can therefore posit that their incentive to assimilate 
at this time was probably weak or non-existent – since to be a regular ‘Hungarian peasant’ 
would not have been an appealing prospect. From an instrumentalist perspective then, that 
Romani groups lived separately from Hungarians, or spoke ‘Romani’ amongst themselves, 
or that they maintained distinct cultural practices, are all quite inconsequential facts, since 
at this time many Romanies lacked good reason to do otherwise.   
 
Elsewhere in Europe, good reason would soon emerge, as policies towards ‘gypsies’ during 
the 16th and 17th centuries became increasingly brutal and repressive. Under the 
Habsburgs, the Holy Roman Empire issued a long series of anti-gypsy legislative acts from 
1551, with such intentions as forbidding them the issue of official documents, banishing 
Romani groups, and flogging and branding captured Romani, even without charge of a 
crime (Fraser, 1992). At the same time, popular anti-gypsy sentiment was stoked all over, 
with the Romani frequently labeled ‘sorcerers’, ‘vagrants’ and Ottoman ‘spies’ (ibid). The 
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fact that the Romani lived outside of feudal structures, while advantageous in some 
respects, also contributed to their negative image, as some poverty-stricken Romanies 
earned a particular reputation for thievery in the towns (ibid)  
 
Given the disdain for them brewing elsewhere in Europe, it can be said to have been 
extremely fortunate for the Romani that much of the Kingdom of Hungary fell to the 
Ottomans in 1541, with a small strip of ‘Royal Hungary’ retained by the Habsburgs. In 
contrast to the active persecution of Romanies sought in the Christian lands, the Ottomans’ 
attitude towards them was mostly one of indifference (Barany, 2001). Like the Hungarian 
monarchs, the Ottomans benefited from the skills of Romani artisans, and were concerned 
more with the collection of taxes than with the peculiarities of Romani customs, making the 
Ottoman lands somewhat of a haven for the Romani (ibid). Meanwhile, in Royal Hungary, 
policies towards them were generally also less coercive and more tolerant than in 
neighboring areas, most likely because the authorities continued to benefit from their skills 
(Fraser, 1992). The imperial governor György Thurzö, for example, seemed to show 
particular concern for the Romani. In 1616, he issued an unusual ‘safe conduct’ for a group 
of them in which he pleaded for understanding of their plight, writing that:  
 
…All animals have their place of habitation, the truly wretched Egyptian race, which 
we call Czingaros, is assuredly to be pitied… In accordance with their ancient custom 
they are used to leading a very hard life, in the fields and meadows outside the 
towns under ragged tents… they do not seek cities, strongholds, towns or princely 
dwellings… and [know] no riches or ambitions, but, day by day and hour by hour, 
looking in the open air for food and clothing by the labor of their hands, using anvils, 
bellows, hammers and tongs. (in Fraser, 1992: 156) 
 
 
As well as displaying an unusual sensitivity to the Romani (omitting the words “truly 
wretched”), Thurzö provides a picture of their isolated and poverty-stricken lives at this 
time, and he implies that this is by their choosing, as a matter of “ancient custom.” Again, 
though we might consider it somewhat notable that the Romani, even after more than a 
century in Hungarian lands, still lived very differently from Hungarians, it’s not obvious that 
the quality of their lives was much worse than that of ordinary peasants, bonded as they 
were to their feudal lords.  
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Coercive Assimilation in the Enlightened Age 
 
 
With the new thinking of the Enlightenment at the end of the 17th century, that advanced a 
conception of man as a changeable and ‘improvable’ being, and the Habsburg recapture of 
Hungary from the Ottomans, policies towards the Romani in the Kingdom fundamentally 
shifted, most markedly during the reign of Empress Maria Theresa and, later, her son 
Joseph II. This was the era of ‘Enlightened Absolutism’ and, through a series of Royal 
Decrees, the essence of which were mirrored by various other monarchs across Europe, 
Theresa set about a massive attempt at social engineering which aimed to completely 
annihilate the ‘gypsy identity’ and way of life (Barany, 2001). In an effort to settle them, 
Theresa’s first decree (of 1758) banned the Romani from owning horses and made their 
taxation and service to the local feudal lord compulsory. In her second and third decrees (of 
1761 and 1767), she outlawed the official designation ‘Zigani’ and replaced it with the 
terms ‘New Hungarian’ or ‘New settler,’ made military service or learning a trade 
compulsory for Romani boys (ROMBASE, 2003), and forbade Romanies from setting 
themselves apart from Hungarians in dress, speech or occupation (Fraser, 1992). In her 
fourth decree (of 1773), she sought to finally obliterate the ‘gypsy’ identity by forbidding 
marriage between Romanies and forcefully removing Romani children over the age of five 
from their families, so that they could be brought up in non-Romani households. In 
addition, “a gypsy woman marrying a gadźo had to produce proof of industrious household 
service and familiarity with Catholic tenets; in the reverse situation, the male had to prove 
ability to support a wife and children” (Fraser, 1992: 159). Joseph II continued and 
furthered his mother’s policies through a series of his own decrees (from 1783), banning 
smithery (to force the Romani into agriculture), limiting the number of gypsy musicians, 
and ordering monthly reports on the ‘gypsy way of life’ (ibid). Importantly, he also 
provided a law against the use of the ‘gypsy language,’ for which a flogging of twenty-four 
blows would be given (ROMBASE, 2003).   
 
It is difficult to gauge precisely what the ‘net’ effect of these policies was on the Hungarian 
Romani. Their documented persistence, however, evidences that the stated aim of 
completely destroying the ‘gypsies’ through totalistic assimilation was not achieved.  
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In many cases, it must be said that the policies enacted by the Enlightened monarchs were 
not effectively enforced at the local level, with the notable exception of Bergenland (now 
Austria), where they were enforced vigorously, and where many Romani may indeed have 
been assimilated (ROMBASE, 2003). This conclusion is drawn primarily on the basis of the 
disappearance of Romani names from the census data of several towns in the area (ibid).  
 
Because of the generally lackluster enforcement, it could never be accurate to say that all 
the Romanies who persisted did so because of their own volition. Nevertheless, where the 
policies were enforced, there is reason to believe that many Romanies actively resisted 
them. As Fraser remarks, “the ‘New Hungarians’ gave ample proof of their incorrigibility, 
refusing to conform in the extinction of their identity and the break-up of the family” 
(1992: 159). Children who had been plucked from their families were prone to fleeing back 
to them; ‘settled’ Romanies often left the box-like houses they had been provided empty 
and lived in their own shelters; and Romani couples continued to marry according to their 
own customary ceremonies, unworried that their unions would go unrecognized by the 
Emperor (ibid). Another small clue to suggest the resistance of the Romani to the 
destruction of their culture can perhaps be drawn from the fact that, despite measures to 
restrict their number, the late eighteenth and early 19th centuries witnessed a sharp rise in 
Romani musicianship, and this is considered somewhat of a golden age for ‘gypsy’ music 
(Kemény, 2005). Rather comically, in his 1783 dissertation Die Zigeuner (which related 
specifically to the Hungarian Romani), Grellmann observed the fixedness of the Romani 
identity as follows (in a very eighteenth century manner): 
 
…A boy (for you must begin with them from children, and not meddle with the old 
stock, on whom no efforts will take effect), would frequently appear in the oft 
promising train to civilization, on a sudden his wild nature would break out, he 
relapsed, and became a perfect gypsy again. (1787: xvi) 
 
 
Whatever the efforts, passive or otherwise, of Romanies to preserve their culture and 
identity in spite of the assimilatory policies, it is highly probable that these (and 
subsequent land reforms of the early 19th century) were heavily responsible for two big 
changes in the Hungarian Romani which are still in evidence today, the first being their 
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increased propensity to ‘settle,’ and the second being a decline in the extent of their use of 
the Romani language. These two outcomes were recorded in the Hungarian20 census of 
1893, in which 90 percent of the 270,000 Romani listed were described as ‘sedentary.’ Of 
these, less than half spoke Romani (Fraser, 1992: 212).  
 
 
 
The 19th and Early 20th Centuries   
 
 
The start of the 19th century saw the virtual abandonment of the coercive assimilatory 
efforts that had characterized the preceding era. The age of Romanticism led to an 
increased toleration on the part of the authorities to ‘gypsy ways’, and notions of the 
Romani as ‘noble savages’ replaced earlier, more negative, stereotypes in many educated 
circles, stimulating significant scholarly interest in the Romani (Hancock, 2002). In 
Hungary, the Archduke Joseph Karl Ludwig (ironically, the grandson of Maria Theresa) 
took a particular interest in them, even learning the Romani language and studying their 
musical traditions. Ludwig founded several Romani ‘colonies’ around Hungary, where he 
procured Romanies’ work and accommodation, and he established a special school for 
Romani children (though these were small and ultimately short-lived projects) (Fraser, 
1992). The mid-to-late 19th century also saw a large influx of Romani ex-slaves from 
Wallachia and Maldavia, who were officially emancipated in 1856 (ibid).  
 
In economic terms, the 19th century was not particularly negative for the Romani. As in the 
previous century, and further evidencing the failures of the Enlightenment policies, Romani 
groups were mostly self-employed in traditional trades such as metal-smithing, the making 
of wooden utensils and mud-bricks, and there were a large number of Romani musicians 
and horse-traders (Fraser, 1992). From 1867, Hungary (now as part of Austro-Hungary) 
experienced strong economic growth, and this had a positive knock-on effect for many 
Romani, whose skills and labor were increasingly sought for the construction of towns and 
                                                        
20 These figures refer to the ‘then’ state of Hungary, which was three times its present size. Kemény 
calculates that about 23 percent of this total lived in the area corresponding to contemporary 
Hungary, 80 percent of whom were native Hungarian speakers (2005: 22-27).  
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villages (Kemény, 2005). Kemény asserts that, by the 1893 census, “the situation of the 
Roma was significantly better than it had been in earlier decades or centuries” (2005: 41). 
Despite this, average economic outcomes for the Romani in Hungary were still very poor. 
According to the 1893 census, most Romani were living in one or two room houses, and 
some in tents, mostly in separated enclaves in rural villages. Up to 70 percent of Romani 
children of school age were not attending, and 90 percent of all Romani were found to be 
illiterate (Fraser, 1992: 213).  
 
The first decades of the 20th century saw a worsening in the economic situation of the 
Romani, as new enforcement of trade licensing laws served to the detriment of their largely 
unlicensed tradesman (Kemény, 2005). ‘Racial’ prejudice against Romanies also increased, 
in line with the general trend across Europe at the time. This, coupled with the intensified 
‘magyarization’ policies of the post-Trianon years, led to an upsurge in actions to coercively 
integrate and control the Romani (Helsinki Watch, 1993). The police were instructed to 
deport Romanies whose Hungarian citizenship could not be verified, and ‘travelling’ 
Romanies became subject to new, draconian policies. A 1928 Interior Ministry decree, for 
example, stated that:  
 
…Whether they practice migration in order to avoid work, or do so under the 
pretext of looking for work, the forces of public order are obliged to arrest and 
detain [the Romani] where they are found and then to deposit them at the nearest 
police headquarters. (in Kemény, 2005: 47) 
 
 
This period culminated in the ‘Porajmos,’ during which it is estimated that about 30,000 of 
Hungary’s Romani were deported and slaughtered, the Nazis only having entered the 
country in 1944 (Fraser, 1992).  
 
 
 
Under Socialism 
  
 
The attitudes and polices of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (HSWP) towards the 
Romani were mixed and somewhat confused. In 1958, the HSWP endorsed a policy of 
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support for ‘gypsy culture’ and education, but this was quickly reversed in 1961 when it 
officially recognized “the abject poverty and profound socio-economic marginality of the 
Roma” (Barany, 2000: 427). The party then implemented a policy of forced assimilation 
and efforts to suppress notions of a distinct ‘gypsy’ identity, underpinned by the 
communist ideology that stressed ‘gypsy ways’ to be products of prior Romani exclusion 
from the economic means of production (Stewart, 1987). Assimilatory efforts included 
resettlement, education and employment. The 1961 HSWP decree stated that: 
 
[The ‘gypsy’ problem] is a social problem rather than a minority issue. Policy 
directed at the gypsy population shall start from the principle that despite certain 
ethnographical characteristics they do not constitute a nationality. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Budapest, 2004: 3) 
 
 
By the 1970s, however, the HSWP had essentially reversed this position again. In 1974, it 
called for the establishment of Romani clubs and other organizations and a ‘gypsy’ 
newspaper and even bilingual schools in some areas (Barany, 2000). And by 1984, the era 
of forced assimilation was officially ended when the party declared that “the Roma could 
freely choose between alternative methods of social integration: through preserving its 
culture, traditions, and ethnic identity or by voluntary assimilation” (Barany, 2000: 427). 
The recognition of a distinct Romani culture was marked in 1986 by the establishment of 
the ‘Rom Cultural Association,’ an organization that banded together 200 local Romani 
clubs and dance ensembles, and received official funding of 8 million Florints (Puxon, 
1992).  
 
In economic terms, the forced industrialization of the Hungarian economy, undertaken 
from the 1950s on, was generally beneficial for the Romani, as significant numbers moved 
from seasonal work in agriculture or traditional craftwork to full-time roles in industry, 
and full employment was achieved in many areas of the country (Kemény, 2005). Notably, 
however, despite widespread Romani participation in the industrial wage labor mandated 
by the HSWP, many Romanies continued to practice traditional trades, such as horse-
trading, in their free time (described at length in Stewart, 1987). The resettlement 
programs improved the general housing conditions of the Romani. Official figures state that 
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the number of Romani ‘slum dwellings’ fell from 50,000 in 1964 to around 5,000 by 1984, 
though these numbers were probably exaggerated (Helsinki Watch, 1993). Overall, the 
position of the Romani, though improved, was still poor. A representative survey in 1971 
(in Kemény, 2005) revealed that 52 percent of Romanies were illiterate and 60 percent 
were found to be living in ‘isolated’ or ‘segregated’ settlements. Only 0.5 percent of Romani 
males were classified as ‘students,’ whereas this was 8.2 percent for the non-Romani 
population (Kemény, 2005). Moreover, once the official assimilation policies were dropped, 
the segregation of Romani children in schools intensified. They were often sent to either 
‘special’ classes or schools, which “were usually overcrowded, often led by uncaring or 
poorly qualified teachers, many of whom were assigned to ‘gypsy classes’ as a form of 
punishment” (Helsinki Watch, 1993: 7).   
 
The 1971 survey also revealed that 71 percent of Romanies in Hungary spoke Hungarian as 
their mother tongue, 21 percent were native Romani speakers, and about 8 percent were 
Romanian speakers (ibid). Interestingly, these figures roughly correspond to three distinct 
Romani migrations to Hungary, the ‘Hungarian’ or ‘Rumongro’ Romani (those who had 
been present in Hungary for several centuries); followed by the ‘Vlachs’ (many of whom are 
the descendants of Romanies from the Romanian principalities who had come to Hungary 
in the late 19th century) and the Beás (also having migrated from Romania, but speaking 
an old Romanian dialect as opposed to Romani) (ibid).  
 
Notwithstanding some real improvements in the social and economic positions of the 
Romani under socialism, they were still a subjugated and impoverished group by 1990, at 
which time two-thirds of the Romani lived below the poverty line (Barany, 2000).    
 
 
Contemporary Hungary 
 
 
The period following Hungary’s transition to a market economy and democracy produced 
effects that were familiar across Central and Eastern Europe. Most notably, unemployment 
soared, but was borne disproportionately by the Romani, for whom the registered rate was 
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almost 50 percent in 199321, as opposed to 13 percent for the non-Romani population 
(Kemény, 2005). The Romani also suffered disproportionately in the domains of education, 
housing and health service provision, as the quality of these services deteriorated much 
more sharply in areas with majority Romani populations (Helsinksi Watch, 1993).  
 
In terms of political representation and rights, democratization produced significant 
legislative advances for minority recognition and representation in Hungary. This 
culminated in the 1993 Minorities Act, which marked the official recognition of thirteen 
groups, twelve of which were described at ‘national’ groups, and one as ‘ethnic,’ the latter 
being the Romani (Krizsân, 2000). The most important ‘pillar’ of the Act was its provision 
for recognized minorities to establish self-governing institutions at the local and national 
level (composed of representatives elected by local delegates) (ibid). These institutions: 
 
…May participate in legislative and administrative work from the lowest to the 
highest levels of governance, express views on draft legal regulations, and request 
information from public administrative bodies and local governments on issues 
affecting the minority they represent and propose and initiate measures. They have 
a right of veto over matters concerning education, culture, local media, efforts to 
sustain traditions and the use of the minorities’ languages. (Krizsân, 2000: 253). 
 
 
The number of Romanies in Hungary varies according to the measure used22, but even the 
lowest estimates would still make them by far the largest of the recognized minorities. 
Despite this, and despite the relatively encouraging institutional landscape in Hungary after 
1993, Romani political mobilizations have been small in scale, largely ineffective and 
fraught with internal division (Barany, 1998), though it seems that this is particularly the 
case at the national level. At the local level, the political efforts of Romanies have been 
somewhat more effective. For example, in 1998 the Romani established self-governing 
institutions in 764 settlements, and this increased to 998 in 2002 (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Budapest, 2004). Nevertheless, these results should be viewed cautiously as the 
                                                        
21 These are the most conservative figures. The Helsinksi Watch report of 1993 details the 
unemployment rate for the Romani at between 60-70 percent, as opposed to 14 percent for the 
general population.  
22 For example, as of 1990, self-identification via the census produced a figure of about 1.4 percent 
of the population, whereas the estimations of minority organizations from the same year put the 
number at 6 percent (based on figures from Kemény, 2005).   
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representativeness of many such elections has been called into question. Due to the fact 
that the Minorities Act did not require that minority voters (or candidates) register as such, 
both the voters and sometimes the candidates in local minority elections did not belong to 
the respective minority, with the same candidates sometimes participating in elections for 
multiple different minorities (Krizsân, 2000) (the Act was amended in 2004 to prevent 
this).   
 
Spurred by pressure exerted on Hungary to improve the situation of its Romani minority in 
the run-up to the country’s accession to the EU, it seems that national initiatives have 
somewhat improved the objective social, economic and political positions of the Romani 
vis-à-vis the non-Romani population. As outlined by Spirova & Budd (2008) drawing on a 
UNDP survey, the social and economic disparity between Romani and comparable non-
Romani, for the most part, is less severe in Hungary than in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Nevertheless, disparities exist in each welfare category mentioned. From poverty and 
unemployment to educational attainment and living conditions, the Romani are worse off 
than non-Romani who live in close proximity, and 57 percent of surveyed Romani said 
their lives had deteriorated in the five years preceding 2001-2002 (Spirova & Budd, 2008: 
97). 
 
 
Explaining the Persistence of the Romani – Pride or Prejudice?  
 
 
For almost 600 years, since their arrival from the Byzantine Empire, the Romani have 
existed and persisted in and around the area corresponding to present-day Hungary. A very 
conservative assessment of the ethnic calculus as it would have pertained to their earliest 
experiences might plausibly conclude that, in the absence of much active persecution, 
Romani groups occupied a beneficial economic niche as skilled tradesman and musicians 
living outside of the, often brutal, feudal regime. So the salience of the Romani for, say, their 
first century in the Kingdom can be made intelligible by this fact. From the mid-16th 
century, the situation changed dramatically in the rest of Europe, as Romanies became 
increasingly persecuted. But, again, with most of Hungary under the relatively indifferent 
authority of the Ottomans at this time, and policies in ‘Royal Hungary’ also much friendlier 
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than elsewhere, the Romani in this area did not have much of an incentive to assimilate into 
the Hungarian peasantry. The cessation of this period was marked by the Habsburg 
recapture of Hungarian lands at the dawn of the Enlightenment, and from this period on, 
right up to the present day, to be Romani has, in terms of welfare outcomes, been invariably 
worse than to be gadže. An assessment of the relative value of their political benefits has 
been mostly unnecessary because, for most of the time considered and for most of the 
wider population concerned, there were very few or none. But as we have seen, in 
economic terms the Romanies have suffered at the margins of society for many 
generations.  
 
In the absence of favorable benefits having accrued to the Romani, answers to the question 
of why they have persisted can essentially be boiled-down to two possibilities, only one of 
which is congruent with our instrumentalist model. Either Romanies have endured 
because, while having the motive to assimilate (given by inequality), they have not had the 
means, presumably because of some attribute specific or systemic restriction on identity 
change. Or, they have endured, despite inequality, because they value being Romani, that is, 
because of some intrinsic value. In the first case, we would have expected to see policies of 
entrenched, institutionalized exclusion and a solidified ethnic boundary that prevented the 
dissolution of the Romani, but as we have seen, the policies of the Enlightened monarchs, 
highly coercive though they were, actually constituted the inverse of what our model refers 
to as restrictions on change. Far from a rigidified ethnic boundary, the assimilatory policies 
sought to forcefully break down Romani/non-Romani differences. Similarly, though less 
coercively, the Romani were subject to strong assimilatory pressures during the socialist 
period. At other times, they were treated simply with disdain or indifference, but their 
incentive to assimilate was ever present.  
 
So turning to the second possibility, would it be fair to say that, because of the general 
failure of the Romanies to dissolve, that they have persisted of their own volition, because 
of the value they placed on being and living as Romani? Is it pride that has sustained them? 
To draw this conclusion on a wholesale basis would be clearly erroneous because to 
ascertain definitively that the Romani have endured of their own accord, we would need to 
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know that they have had a real shot at becoming ‘non-Romani Hungarians,’ and while this 
may have been the case from a policy perspective, I suspect that it has perhaps never truly 
been the case from a popular perspective. Popular prejudice and suspicion towards 
Romanies has been entrenched across Europe for centuries, and it’s inconceivable that this 
has not played a key role in stiffing their assimilation. Moreover, what made that prejudice 
‘stick’ was the fact that the Romani are and were easily identifiable. And what made them 
identifiable, beyond their customs, language (which, in many cases for the Hungarian 
Romani has been lost) or segregated lives was the color of their skin, which is explicitly 
noted in almost all of the first hand accounts of the Romani by Europeans from the fifteenth 
century on.23  
 
A large portion of the conundrum of explaining Romani persistence can be addressed once 
we take stock of the dual-character of ethnic identity, as both an attributed category and a 
self-ascribed one. Szelényi & Ladányi (2006) provide an illuminating study that reveals a 
very large discrepancy between the self-identifications of Hungarian Romani and the 
attribution of that identity by ‘outsiders.’ In their representative sample, only 37 percent of 
those identified as Romani by interviewers self-identified as such on a separate survey. 
Moreover, skin color was found to be the ‘most important’ indicator to influence the 
decision of interviewers. A separate study in Hungary by Csepeli & Simon (2004) revealed 
exactly the same discrepancy between in-group/ out-group classifications, with skin color 
and material deprivation found to be the most important indicators for attributing Romani 
identity to interviewees.  
 
Though the results of studies like these are not ultimately definitive, they do signal towards 
two crucial points for our purposes. Firstly, that many (or perhaps most) Romanies in 
Hungary do not want to be considered as such, and secondly, that skin color may serve as 
an attribute-specific restriction on their assimilation, regardless of their incentives or 
desires. In addition, because we know that the largest part of the Hungarian Romani are 
both ‘settled’ and native Hungarian speakers, it would appear that skin color has 
technically been the crucial facilitator of their continued exclusion and marginalization. 
                                                        
23 A number of such accounts are contained in Fraser (1992).  
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Given the profound animosity often shown towards Romanies in popular culture, the 
media24, and, to a growing extent, in politics (as evidenced recently by the rise of ‘Jobbik,’ a 
fascist and virulently anti-Romani party) and the range of pejorative stereotypes levied at 
them, their continued marginalization has no doubt historically been self-reinforcing given 
the visibility and ‘stickiness’ of skin color.    
 
So are we to conclude then that the Romani are merely a subjugated group who desire 
assimilation but are excluded based an ethnic boundary drawn according to skin color? As 
with the opposite view, that Romani persistence is explainable entirely by their own, 
seemingly non-instrumental ethnic pride, this view provides an equally unsatisfactory and 
incomplete explanation. If we consider the 2011 Hungarian census, in which 308,957 (or 
3.3 percent of the Hungarian population)25 actively self-identified as Romani, and if we take 
the findings of the above studies completely at face value (and apply the result that only 37 
percent of those attributed Romani identity actually self-identify as such), then the total 
number of people considered Romani by their environment in Hungary would be 835,019 
(or 8.9 percent of the population). Deducting the number of ‘self-identifiers’ from this 
figure would mean that 5.6 percent of the Hungarian population are attributed the Romani 
identity without self-identifying as such. Thus, while all Romanies may be subject to 
prejudice, this group might approximately constitute those whose Romani identity is 
constructed solely on the basis of prejudice, though even this conclusion can only be made 
very tentatively, not least because failure to self-identity as Romani on a survey or census 
does not necessarily indicate that an individual does not ‘feel’ Romani. Fear of 
                                                        
24 A survey of popular prejudice in Hungary towards the Romani is unwarranted, but its tone and 
seriousness was captured in a January 2013 editorial published in the Magyar Hírlap newspaper, in 
which Zsolt Bayer, journalist and co-founder of the ruling Fidesz party wrote: "…A significant 
portion of the gypsies are unfit for co-existence, not fit to live among human beings. These people 
are animals and behave like animals... If he finds resistance, he kills... He wants what he sees. If he 
doesn't get it, he takes it and he kills... From his animal skull only inarticulate sounds come out and 
the only thing he understands is brute force... These animals should not exist. No way. This must be 
solved, immediately and in any way possible" (European Roma Rights Center, 2013).  
25 According to the census, the Hungarian population was 9,337,628 in 2011 (Hungarian Central 
Statistics Office, 2011). 
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discrimination or other repercussions may also make respondents wary of disclosing this 
information26. 
 
An ahistorical appraisal of Romani self-identifiers might lead some to speculate that they 
could be the products of modern ethnic entrepreneurs, who, to be sure, have (to a very 
limited extent) surfaced in the context of post-socialist Hungarian politics (see Barany, 
1998; Krizsân, 2000); or they might consider them to be in search of some material claim 
on the modern state for its own sake. But, as we have seen, Romani resistance to 
assimilation is as old in Hungary as they are. Moreover, cultural expressions of Romani 
identity, through language, through music, through traditional trades and ways of life, to 
name a few examples, have surfaced in every historical and institutional setting in which 
the Romani have found themselves. In short, history provides a good indication that many 
Romani, though perhaps only a minority of those who are now externally labeled as such, 
do, in fact, want to be Romani rather than dark-skinned Hungarians.  
 
In turn, it is notable that it is frequently the very cultural expressions of being Romani that 
have produced and informed much anti-Romani prejudice. Thus, the stigmatization and 
marginalization of Romanies has not been drawn, for the most part, from their physical 
characteristics per se, as could be said about the pure ‘racial’ ideologies apparently 
informing Hutu subjugation in colonial Rwanda, or Black/White dichotomies at various 
times around the world, but by characterizations (or, more frequently, 
mischaracterizations) of Romani lifestyles. Though the nuances may have changed slightly 
over time, the essence of anti-Romani prejudice, whether in Hungary or elsewhere, has 
been formed from a conception of them as profoundly ‘other’ (see Kende, 2000). 
Sometimes, the ‘otherness’ of Romanies has been romanticized, as in the ‘noble savage’ 
stereotypes of the nineteenth century (see Fraser, 1992; Hancock, 2002). More often, 
Romani ‘otherness’ is portrayed with deep negativity and suspicion, as in the ubiquitous 
                                                        
26 Non-disclosure of self-identification is a particularly endemic problem for Romani research. This 
results from the deep suspicion towards outsiders felt by many Romani communities. Weyrauch & 
Bell, for example note that: “Gypsies believe they should approach and respond to the gaje with 
caution, especially if [they] profess good intentions, claim to serve the best interest of the gypsies, 
or propagate some abstract ideals of non-Gypsy origin, such as the scholarly pursuit of truth” 
(1993: 337). See also Hancock (2002).  
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imagery of the ‘gypsy’ exonym. Trumpener summarizes the popular imagination of ‘gypsy’ 
life as follows: 
 
Moving through civil society, the gypsies apparently remain beyond reach of 
everything that constitutes Western identity […] outside of historical record and 
historical time, outside of Western law, the Western nation state, and Western 
economic orders, outside of writing and discursivity itself. All the gypsies have, all 
they need, all they know is their own collectivity, which survives all odds and 
persecutions, as if their identity inheres in their very blood. (1992: 860) 
 
This presents the commonplace outsider’s projection of gypsy identity; one that in folklore 
has unfairly and invariably suggested a group whose exclusion and backwardness is of 
entirely of their own doing  (relatedly, “if only they would civilize themselves” has 
frequently gone the thinking of governments across time and space). Such a 
characterization must be considered ironic given the instrumentalist expectation that the 
Romani would constitute no more than a downtrodden group of ‘out-casts,’ effectively 
excluded on the basis of skin color. Unfortunately, accurate accounts of the construction of 
Romani identity from a Romani perspective are still sparse, save for those provided in the 
most general terms, and this problem is complicated severely by the heterogeneity of 
Romani communities. Nevertheless, enough has been documented about them to establish 
that the majority-constructed gypsy/non-gypsy dichotomy is only half of the story. An 
equally ubiquitous dichotomy lies in the Romani/gadže separation, which is perhaps the 
singly most significant common denominator across Romani communities (Hancock, 
2002). This symbolic, ritualistic separation, which pervades much of Romani culture has, 
no doubt, served a functional role for the Romani by keeping them apart from majority 
populations that have frequently sought to harm them (ibid). But aside from this functional 
value, the Romani-maintained cultural separation from gadže has its roots in a much 
deeper and highly complex belief system; one that has been shown to closely reflect the 
purity/pollution dichotomies found in the Indian caste system (see Hancock, 2002; 
Weyrauch & Bell, 1993, for example). As Fraser notes:  
 
[Romani] pollution beliefs can be seen as a core element of their cultures, serving to 
express and reinforce an ethnic boundary and to delineate a fundamental division 
between gypsy and gadžo […] the taboo system informs all interaction between 
male and female and gypsy and gadžo. And for a gypsy to be declared polluted is the 
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greatest shame a man can suffer, and along with him his household. It is social 
death, for the condition can be passed on: anything he wears or touches or uses is 
polluted for others.  
 
My point here is ultimately a simple one. Romani persistence cannot be reduced to problem 
of out-group exclusion. Though, to be sure, the ‘gypsy’ image has frequently attributed to 
them a status as ‘pariahs,’ and this broad category almost certainly encapsulates a much 
larger group than that which calls itself ‘Romani,’ the Romani too have perpetuated their 
own exclusionary identity and culture; one that, despite its subjugation, is clearly not 
clamoring at the gates of the Hungarian (or any other) ethnic boundary, desperate for 
assimilation. Recognizing this, with a firm appreciation of history, is surely crucial because 
failure to do so serves to perpetuate the indignity that the Romani have so often faced.  
 
This brings us to an important practical implication of instrumentalist theory. If it were 
merely skin color that is holding back the Romani, then reducing ‘racism’ in Hungarian 
society would appear to be the remedy for improving their situation. The same effect would 
be brought about by any natural increases in the physical or ‘racial’ heterogeneity of the 
Hungarian population, through immigration or intermarriage, by decreasing the viability of 
exclusion based on skin tone. In either case, the recognition of the Romani as a distinct 
‘ethnic’ group for the purpose of endorsing their cultural equality would be unnecessary 
because the instrumentalist view supposes that no Romani would want to remain so in a 
world where one could be a Hungarian, holding other things constant. Given the right 
incentives and absent prohibitory costs, the Romani would simply dissolve into the 
dominant group. It’s easy to see how this view is highly reminiscent of the mechanical 
thinking of the Enlightenment, and why it might easily be considered misguided at best, 
and offensive at worst.  
 
In sum, above I have provided an outline of the material situation and institutional contexts 
to which Romani groups in the area broadly corresponding to contemporary Hungary have 
been subject since their arrival almost 600 years ago. It has been made clear that, for most 
of their time in the area, they were subject to strong assimilatory pressures, given by their 
persistent economic marginality and varyingly coercive efforts to integrate them. 
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Explaining their endurance is no doubt a highly multifaceted problem, and the complexity 
of relevant factors across time has meant that I have only been able to touch upon this here.  
I suggest that it is highly probable that out-group attributions with prejudicial 
underpinnings (given on the basis of attribute-specific restrictions on identity change) 
account for much of the diverse group regarded en masse as ‘gypsies’ today in Hungary, but 
this still leaves a large number of self-identifying Romani seemingly unaccounted for by 
instrumentalist theory. In figure 4, I provide a presentation of the pattern of Romani 
identification as it may manifest in contemporary Hungary. 
 
Figure 4. Tentative characterization of the Romani in Contemporary Hungary 
 
The importance of skin color for out-group attributions of Romani identity would imply 
that the persistence of much of the Romani group could rest, to a large extent, on the 
physical homogeneity of the broader Hungarian population. As such, the plight of many 
Romanies can probably be boiled-down to simple ‘racism,’ the reduction of which in 
Hungarian society may do very well to foster Romani integration and assimilation. But, 
from the perspective of the broader study of ethnicity, it is those who actively self-identify 
as Romani - whom I suggest have most likely preserved and perpetuated their own 
exclusionary identity - on whom I believe future research should focus. Additionally, 
though the practical constraints of the present study required that I focus on one area, the 
Romani are clearly very much more than a Hungarian phenomenon and I suggest that the 
most fruitful studies on the Romani should consider them across space as well as across 
time. This is not least the case because skin color is not likely to be able to effectively 
account for the exclusion of Romani groups in countries where dark skin is prevalent 
among the larger population.  
 
 
ERomani < ENon-Romani 
R* ≥ (ENon-Romani - ERomani) 
 
*If, as Szelényi & Ladányi (2006) show, skin color is indeed 
the principal marker distinguishing Romani from Non-
Romani. 
 
≈ 37% Self-Identifying Romani 
 
 
≈ Remainder, out-group attributions.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In itself, the now almost universally accepted idea that ethnic groups are endogenous 
entities, constructed and reshaped through societal processes, says nothing in particular 
about their nature. Just because we are all now ‘constructivists’ does not close the door on a 
wide variety of theories concerning this. In this thesis, I have analyzed a particular view 
regarding the nature of ethnicity and of what drives ethnic behavior, termed 
‘instrumentalist.’ This view sees ethnic groups as coalitions of self-interested agents, and 
thus sees membership in an ethnic group as a constrained choice, the purpose of which is 
the pursuit of maximal benefits. For instrumentalists, ethnic groups and identities are, 
therefore, not valued intrinsically, but for the outcomes with which they are associated. I 
have synthesized the basic propositions of instrumentalism into a conceptual model, and 
with the core tenets and expectations of instrumentalism elucidated, I have then applied 
this model to test its explanatory power in three cases, each involving a distinct theoretical 
problem.  
 
In ‘Yorubaland,’ the problem to be addressed was that of ethnic identity change, but this 
case also involved ethnogenesis, or the construction of an ethnic group that had not 
previously existed as such. It was shown that both ethnogenesis and ethnic identity change 
(through activation) were consistent with instrumentalism. Specifically, the new incentive 
structures produced within the consolidated colonial state, and subsequently, served to 
invest the ‘pan-Yoruba’ identity with broad political and economic value, while not 
negating the value of sub-Yoruba ancestral-city identifications.  
 
In the case of Rwanda, the emergence of the Hutu/ Tutsi ethnic cleavage also involved 
ethnogenesis, since these categories were ‘ethnicized’ within the context of the colonial 
state. But the principal theoretical problem to be explained here was the emergence and 
persistence of an ethnic cleavage that embodied stark inequality. Congruent with 
instrumentalist theory, this cleavage was enabled, before and after the country’s 
independence, by a rigidified ethnic boundary that prevented the assimilation and 
dissolution of the subjugated group. This boundary, moreover, was facilitated in terms of 
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attribute-specific restrictions on identity change, given by physical stereotypes, but much 
more significantly, by what I have termed a systemic or institutional restriction, given in 
this case by ethnic identity cards.  
 
While both the Hutu/ Tutsi cleavage, and the emergence of the Yoruba, constituted 
relatively discreet and recent phenomena, the many centuries-long persistence of the 
Romani is a theoretical problem that requires substantial scrutiny of a breadth of historical 
and institutional contexts. Given the huge scope of such an inquiry, I chose to delimit my 
analysis to historic and contemporary Hungary, as Romani groups have been consistently 
present in this area for almost 600 years. For a significant part of this time, the Romani 
have persisted in a state of severe subjugation, often living segregated and distinctly 
different lives from the non-Romani population. In light of this, instrumentalist theory 
would have expected that entrenched, institutionalized exclusion facilitated by a rigid 
ethnic boundary has perpetuated the Romani. But as we have seen, from a policy 
perspective during both the Enlightenment and during socialism, the Romani were 
institutionally subject to coercive efforts to assimilate them. At other times, institutional 
attempts to assimilate the Romani may have been downplayed, nevertheless, their 
subjugated position gave them a strong incentive to assimilate and homogenize with the 
broader Hungarian population, according to instrumentalist theory.  
 
While the persistence of the Romani may not be accounted for by way of policy responses, I 
have suggested that popular prejudice has undoubtedly played a role in stifling their 
assimilation. Moreover, it is highly likely that an attribute-specific restriction (skin color), 
has facilitated their marginalization, and that their enduring subjugation has therefore 
been historically self-reinforcing. With this in mind, the persistence of the ‘gypsy’ category 
in Hungary can, to a significant extent, be accounted for in a way that is consistent with 
instrumentalism. But instrumentalist theory fails to provide answers to many interesting 
questions, such as why a significant number of people actively self-identify as Romani in 
Hungary, and, why Romani customs and the Romani language persist, to any extent. 
Additionally, I have focused above on only one side of the story, having not considered the 
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question of what instrumental purpose, if any, the exclusion of the Romani might have 
served for the non-Romani. 
 
So, can ethnic groups be reduced purely to interest groups and can ethnic group 
membership be reduced to a welfare calculus between costs and benefits? In at least two of 
the cases considered above, instrumentalist expectations seem to hold substantial 
explanatory power. In the case of the Romani, the results of the present study appear 
largely mixed. My hypothesis, that ethnic groups can hold intrinsic value for their members, 
cannot be definitively confirmed on the basis of the data I have considered, or according to 
the theoretical model I have constructed, because I have not been able to ascertain, in the 
Hungarian context, that the Romani have endured as such of their own accord, and not as a 
result of imposed costs on their dissolution. But while, strictly speaking, this means that 
definitive conclusions cannot be drawn out here, I strongly consider that further research 
on the Romani is warranted. As a salient ethnic group that has persisted for centuries 
through an enormous variety of institutional settings, more extensive historical analysis, 
and more research on the modern construction of Romani identity across space, would be 
highly profitable for the study of ethnicity. If we are to learn what, if anything, is ‘special’ 
about ethnic identity, then such a pursuit would no doubt give valuable insight into this 
question, affirmative or not. 
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